University of Tennessee, Knoxville

TRACE: Tennessee Research and Creative
Exchange
Doctoral Dissertations

Graduate School

8-2012

Hard and Soft Error Resilience for One-sided Dense Linear Algebra
Algorithms
Peng Du
rick.peng.du@gmail.com

Follow this and additional works at: https://trace.tennessee.edu/utk_graddiss
Part of the Numerical Analysis and Computation Commons, and the Other Computer Engineering
Commons

Recommended Citation
Du, Peng, "Hard and Soft Error Resilience for One-sided Dense Linear Algebra Algorithms. " PhD diss.,
University of Tennessee, 2012.
https://trace.tennessee.edu/utk_graddiss/1445

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at TRACE: Tennessee
Research and Creative Exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Doctoral Dissertations by an authorized
administrator of TRACE: Tennessee Research and Creative Exchange. For more information, please contact
trace@utk.edu.

To the Graduate Council:
I am submitting herewith a dissertation written by Peng Du entitled "Hard and Soft Error
Resilience for One-sided Dense Linear Algebra Algorithms." I have examined the final electronic
copy of this dissertation for form and content and recommend that it be accepted in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, with a major in Computer
Science.
Jack Dongarra, Major Professor
We have read this dissertation and recommend its acceptance:
Michael Berry, James Plank, Xiaobing Feng, Jack Dongarra
Accepted for the Council:
Carolyn R. Hodges
Vice Provost and Dean of the Graduate School
(Original signatures are on file with official student records.)

University of Tennessee, Knoxville

Trace: Tennessee Research and Creative
Exchange
Doctoral Dissertations

Graduate School

8-2012

Hard and Soft Error Resilience for One-sided
Dense Linear Algebra Algorithms
Peng Du
rick.peng.du@gmail.com

Recommended Citation
Du, Peng, "Hard and Soft Error Resilience for One-sided Dense Linear Algebra Algorithms. " PhD diss., University of Tennessee, 2012.
http://trace.tennessee.edu/utk_graddiss/1445

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at Trace: Tennessee Research and Creative Exchange. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Doctoral Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Trace: Tennessee Research and Creative Exchange. For more
information, please contact trace@utk.edu.

To the Graduate Council:
I am submitting herewith a dissertation written by Peng Du entitled "Hard and Soft Error Resilience for
One-sided Dense Linear Algebra Algorithms." I have examined the final electronic copy of this
dissertation for form and content and recommend that it be accepted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, with a major in Computer Science.
Jack Dongarra, Major Professor
We have read this dissertation and recommend its acceptance:
Michael Berry, James Plank, Xiaobing Feng, Jack Dongarra
Accepted for the Council:
Carolyn R. Hodges
Vice Provost and Dean of the Graduate School
(Original signatures are on file with official student records.)

Hard and Soft Error Resilience for
One-sided Dense Linear Algebra
Algorithms

A Thesis Presented for
The Doctor of Philosophy
Degree
The University of Tennessee, Knoxville

Peng Du
August 2012

c by Peng Du, 2012
All Rights Reserved.

ii

This dissertation is dedicated to my dearest parents, Wenjian Du and Xinzhi Liu.

iii

Acknowledgements
I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my advisor, Dr. Jack Dongarra, for
his guidance, motivation, and support during my graduate study at the Innovative
Computing Laboratory (ICL). Dr. Dongarra has provided me extensive support,
and valuable discussions throughout the process of this research. I am grateful to Dr.
Dongarra for the generous financial support for this research and ample opportunities
to share the research ideas in various conferences and workshops.
In addition, I would like to thank Dr. Michael Berry, Dr. James Plank, and Dr.
Xiaobing Feng for agreeing to serve on my graduate committee. I greatly appreciate
their time and invaluable advice to this dissertation.
I would also like to express my appreciation to Dr. Piotr Luszczek, Dr. Stanimire
Tomov, Dr. Julien Langou and, especially, to Dr. George Bosilca, and the whole
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Abstract
Dense matrix factorizations, such as LU, Cholesky and QR, are widely used by
scientific applications that require solving systems of linear equations, eigenvalues
and linear least squares problems. Such computations are normally carried out on
supercomputers, whose ever-growing scale induces a fast decline of the Mean Time To
Failure (MTTF). This dissertation develops fault tolerance algorithms for one-sided
dense matrix factorizations, which handles Both hard and soft errors.
For hard errors, we propose methods based on diskless checkpointing and
Algorithm Based Fault Tolerance (ABFT) to provide full matrix protection, including
the left and right factor that are normally seen in dense matrix factorizations.
A horizontal parallel diskless checkpointing scheme is devised to maintain the
checkpoint data with scalable performance and low space overhead, while the ABFT
checksum that is generated before the factorization constantly updates itself by
the factorization operations to protect the right factor. In addition, without an
available fault tolerant MPI supporting environment, we have also integrated the
Checkpoint-on-Failure(CoF) mechanism into one-sided dense linear operations such
as QR factorization to recover the running stack of the failed MPI process.
Soft error is more challenging because of the silent data corruption, which
leads to a large area of erroneous data due to error propagation.

Full matrix

protection is developed where the left factor is protected by column-wise local diskless
checkpointing, and the right factor is protected by a combination of a floating point
weighted checksum scheme and soft error modeling technique. To allow practical use

vi

on large scale system, we have also developed a complexity reduction scheme such
that correct computing results can be recovered with low performance overhead.
Experiment results on large scale cluster system and multicore+GPGPU hybrid
system have confirmed that our hard and soft error fault tolerance algorithms exhibit
the expected error correcting capability, low space and performance overhead and
compatibility with double precision floating point operation.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Today’s high performance computers have paced into Petaflops realm, through the
increase of system scale. The number of system components, such as CPU cores,
memory, networking, and storage grow considerably.

One of the most powerful

Petaflops scale machines, Kraken [2], from National Institute for Computational
Sciences and University of Tennessee, harnessed as many as 112,800 cores to reach
its peak performance of 1.17 Petaflops to rank No.11 on the November 2011 Top500
list. With the increase of system scale and chip density, the reliability and availability
of such systems has declined. It has been shown that, under specific circumstances,
adding computing units might hamper applications completion time, as a larger node
count implies a higher probability of reliability issues. This directly translates into a
lower efficiency of the machine, which equates to a lower scientific throughput [128]. It
is estimated that the MTTF of High Performance Computing (HPC) systems might
drop to about one hour in the near future [28]. Without a drastic change at the
algorithmic level, such a failure rate will certainly prevent capability applications
from progressing. It is utterly important that e↵ective fault tolerances technique is
developed such that application can have the resilience to the reality of supercomputer
systems with unavoidable failures.

1

Exploring techniques for creating a software ecosystem and programming environment capable of delivering computation at extreme scale, that are both resilient
and efficient, will eliminate a major obstacle to scientific productivity on tomorrow’s
HPC platforms. In this dissertation, we advocate that in extreme scale environments,
successful approaches to fault tolerance (e.g. those which exhibit acceptable recovery
times and memory requirements) must go beyond traditional systems-oriented
techniques and leverage intimate knowledge of dominant application algorithms,
in order to create a middleware that is far more adapted and responsive to the
application’s performance and error characteristics.
In this work, we focus on one-sided dense linear algebra algorithms. Many of such
algorithms, such as LU and QR factorization are at the center of computational
scientific applications from solving large system of linear equations to eigenvalue
problems. One famous example of such applications is the High Performance Linpack
(HPL) benchmark program [48] that is used to gauge the performance of world’s
fastest supercomputers by the Top500 [99]. On large scale systems, it is not unusual
that running the tuned HPL benchmark takes more than 24 hours [46], passing
the MTTF of these systems according to [28], and to make things worse, unlike
hard error which crashes part or the complete system and stops applications from
further execution, soft error, normally induced by imperfect material packaging and
radiation rays, could silently lead to incorrect result without leaving traces. Soft
errors also cannot be detected by the widely adopted checkpointing/restart fault
tolerance mechanism, which incurs excessive overhead in both storage, computing
performance, and energy consumption, and therefore alternative methods must be
sought. On the road to this path, we identify the error correcting capability, low
overhead, and floating point operation compatibility as the indispensable components
for practical fault tolerance algorithms, and these criteria guided the development of
this dissertation.

2

1.1

Problem Statement

The goal of the dissertation is to demonstrate that one-sided dense linear algebra
factorizations and solvers can be made fault tolerant to both hard error (fail-stop
failure) and soft error. By combining the Algorithm Based Fault Tolerance (ABFT)
scheme with strategic disk- and diskless checkpointing and encoding scheme that
is resilient to round-o↵ error from floating point operation, not only can data and
execution flow be recovered from failure, but also it can be achieved efficiently in
both space and run time overhead.

1.2

Contribution

Several fault tolerance techniques are developed in this dissertation such that both
hard and soft error during one-sided dense linear algebra operation can be tolerated
and the computation can reach correct result. The specific contribution of this
research is summarized as follows:

1.2.1

Hard Error

• Scalable Parallel-Q Checkpointing: In a P ⇥ Q process grid, by performing
the diskless checkpointing horizontally every Q iteration of the panel factorization with the checkpoint data stored in the outdated ABFT checksum area,
and using snapshot of for the matrix data before the Q panel factorizations, the
left factor of matrix factorization (for example, LU and QR) can be protected.
Interrupted execution can be resumed by recovering data from both the ABFT
checksum, diskless checksum and data snapshot
• Checkpointing-on-Failure in QR factorization: In Checkpointing-onFailure (CoF) protocol, modification to MPI enables applications to regain control of MPI program after a failure occurs. We combine CoF with the Algorithm

3

Based Fault Tolerance (ABFT) and the parallel-Q checkpointing mechanism to
protect QR factorization from hard error. Disk-based CoF checkpointing is
only performed after failure strikes, allowing optimal checkpointing interval.
And failure propagation e↵ect in the trailing update is solved by delaying the
recovery to the end of the current update step. In addition, through a dry-run
procedure, the running stack of all processes in the grid are recovered to the
same state.

1.2.2

Soft Error

• Scalable Local Checkpointing for the Left Factor of Factorizations:
On distributed memory system, soft error in the left factor is protected by the
local checkpointing scheme. At the end of each panel factorization, processes
that own data in the panel perform diskless checkpointing locally, rather than an
MPI Reduce based global checkpointing. This makes the checkpointing scalable
to both large problem sizes and process grid size. Soft errors in each column
are mitigated separately.
• Floating Point Number Weighted Checksum Encoding: This encoding
scheme is used to fight soft errors in both the left and the right factor. Random
floating point numbers between 0 and 1 form the generator matrix G which is
used to generate the ABFT checksum at the beginning of the factorization. For
t soft errors in one column of the left factor, O(N t ) complexity is required to
locate and correct errors, while O(N t+1 ) is needed for t soft errors in the right
factors. Since soft errors in the right factor propagate, recovery is performed
di↵erently for the solver and factorization. The use of this encoding prevents
large round-o↵ and cancellation errors from floating point operation.
• Complexity Reduction: Since the number of tolerable soft errors t might
cause large overhead than that of the matrix factorization, a complexity
reduction scheme is devised to reduce the complexity to a practical level. The
4

basic idea is breaking N in O(N t ) into smaller segments, for example

p

N,

and the checksum encoding is performed on each segment separately. With
a proof that checksum for each block also obeys the ABFT rule during the
factorization, soft error checking and correcting can be carried out within each
segment, therefore lowering the complexity.
• Detection and Recovery Algorithm for Multiple Soft Errors in Linear
System Solver on Distributed Memory System: Fault tolerant algorithm
for the soft errors in LU factorization based dense linear system solver Ax = b
is developed. In addition to the local checkpointing, floating point number
weighted checksum encoding and complexity reduction, we proposed a technique
to locate the columns of the initial soft errors in the right factor by casting
multiple soft errors into one single di↵erent initial matrix. From this matrix,
the same result of L and U can be reached but through a soft error free
LU factorization. This manipulation allows the development of the O(N t+1 )
algorithm to locate the soft errors. The solution x of the linear system is
recovered by applying the ShermanMorrison formula.
• Detection and Recovery Algorithm for Soft Errors in Matrix Factorization on Hybrid System with the GPGPU: Fault tolerant algorithm for
soft errors in QR factorization is developed for the hybrid system with both
multicore CPU and GPGPU. Based on the local diskless checkpointing method
for the left factor, vectors in the lower triangular matrix that are used to form
the orthogonal left factor Q are protected by the floating point number weighted
checksum performed by CPU in a time gap when CPU awaits GPU to finish the
trailing matrix update. This gap is identified through profiling the hybrid QR
factorization. The right factor R which has su↵ered large area of propagated
errors is recovered by a combination of QR update and an innovative efficient
Givens Rotation for GPGPU.

5

1.3

Dissertation outline

The rest of the dissertation is organized as follows: Chapter 2 gives the background of
fault tolerance with a literature review, the fundamental questions this dissertation
is set out to address, and the error model being used in this writing. Chapter 3
introduces the full matrix protection for hard error, including the parallel-Q protection
for the left factor, ABFT for the right factor, and integration of CoF into QR with the
disk-based checkpointing. Chapter 4 has soft error resilience for dense linear solver
as the main topic. Local checkpointing, floating point weighted checksum encoding,
multiple soft errors and complexity reduction are discussed in details. Chapter 5
extends the work in Chapter 4 to hybrid platform with GPGPU. A scalable CPU
checkpointing and a QR update based recovery algorithm is described along with an
innovative high performance Givens rotation on GPGPU. Chapter 6 concludes the
dissertation and discussed future work.
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Chapter 2
Background
In this work, from a software point of view we focus on tackling two most frequently
seen types of HPC system error: hard error which interrupts program execution,
and soft error in the form of bit flips in computing devices that silently causes
erroneous computing result. The outcome of this work will allow Dense Linear Algebra
(DLA) algorithms to run with high degree of resilience on large scale system and pay
negligible overhead. By eliminating the high-overhead periodic checkpointing, better
energy efficiency and higher computing performance can be attained.

2.1

Relate work

Due to the high complexity of modern HPC system, there is no single technique
that can provide reliable fault tolerance to the entire system. Reliability is normally
provided on a level by level basis [22]. Numerous methods have been developed to deal
with di↵erent kind of error and failure at various levels of the architecture, ranging
from the lowest level circuit hardware to the user application software at the top. To
put our proposed methods into perspective, a systematic view of the related work is
given in this section. This view include the system memory and cache, computing
logics, software infrastructure and user application.
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2.1.1

The Memory System

The memory system can be divided into main memory and cache memory. And
memory errors are characterized as hard or soft. Hard errors are mostly cased by
production process issues, such as defected silicon or DRAM packaging. Such errors,
once emerging, usually become permanent quickly. Soft errors could originate from
multiple possible sources, such as charged particles, radiation and also the production
process. With the improvement of quality control over the years, nowadays the main
cause of soft errors is electrical disturbance due to cosmic rays.
To combat errors, redundancy-based error checking and correcting code such as
parity [120] and ECC are common methods for memory system. Such methods
range from simple parity code to more complex Hamming [73] or Hsiao [78] codes
which provide single-bit-error-correction and double-bit-error-detection (SEC/DED)
capability. Parity checking has been replacing with ECC for main memory (DRAM)
except in situation where detection of the error is sufficient and correction is
not needed [129].

To deal with multiple-bit error, methods such as double-bit-

error-correcting and triple-bit-error-detecting (DEC-TED) codes [86], single-nibbleerror-correcting and double-nibble-error-detecting (SNC-DND) codes [30], and Reed
Solomon (RS) codes [113] have been proposed. SNC-DND and RS codes are symbol
based error codes, and both DEC-TED and SEC/DED are derived from BCH (BoseChaudhuri-Hocquenghem) code [19, 77] which detects and corrects random bit errors.
Multiple-bit errors can also be treated with memory interleaving [17, 123] which
distributes physically adjacent memory cells into di↵erent memory logical words such
that groups of error are mapped to di↵erent word segments as single error, which
can be corrected by SEC/DED. The main problem of complex ECC with multiple-bit
error capability is the increased circuit, storage and computing overhead [126].
Nowadays most computer systems use commodity ECC DRAM for main memory.
An ECC DIMM provides SEC/DED for each DRAM rank such that low impact to
memory performance is maintained. Recently, it has been reported that memory
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chip failures, possibly resulted from packaging and global circuit issues, may produce
significant downtime [118]. As a result, chipkill-correct level reliability has been
adopted[41, 85, 134, 144], where a DIMM is required to function even if an entire
chip fails.
Cache memory is protected with similar methods to those for the main memory.
Depending on cache levels and write-policy (write through or write-back), di↵erent
ECC codes can been used. For example, for write through and inclusive last level
cache, such as IBM Power 4 [130], ECC is only provided in the last level cache, the
L2 cache for instance. Error in L1 cache line is corrected by re-fetching the cache line
from L2 to overwrite the erroneous L1 cache line. For a detail survey and evaluation
of di↵erent ECC codes for cache memory, please refer to [114]
The general trend in memory error [119] is that error will become more frequent
as chip dimension and critical operating voltage keep shrinking and system scale
keep increasing. Currently the widely used methods such as SEC/DED need to
be modified to mitigate higher error rate, normally at the cost of higher overhead
in storage, time and energy. Even though many e↵orts have been devoted to reduce
such overhead [5, 80, 139, 143], this still does not guarantee perfect reliability because
error could also strike other parts of the system that are not as well protected.

2.1.2

Compute Logic

In addition to the memory system, processing units can also be a↵ected by errors
in the sequential elements (latches and flip-flops) and combinational logic.

As

chip technology speeds into sub-65nm era, logic soft error will be a major concern
HPC systems [101, 102].

Error detection and correction methods for compute

logic can be summarized into two levels: circuit- and architecture-level. At circuit
level, latches based on multiple flip-flops and other special logic circuits with
verification functionalities are used and they normally su↵er from large area and
time overhead [91, 103, 111], or no complete error coverage. At architecture level,
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space or execution redundancy is used to provide fault tolerance. Note that paritybased method for memory systems are not suitable for arithmetic operations. The
most commonly used examples of compute logic error codes are product codes, linear
residue codes, and residue-class codes [96, 112] such as AN code, which checks the
result of operation such as N1
A⇥(N1

N2 by testing the equality of A ⇥ N1

N2 ), where A is a constant and

A ⇥ N2 =

is operator such as plus. Such verification

can be carried out with or without extra dedicated error checking circuit. Compromise
is made between operation delay, design intrusiveness and circuit area overhead.
Although residue code is not applicable to floating-point arithmetic directly, it has
been applied to various stages of the floating-point operations independently [87].
Code-based methods are cost-e↵ective, but custom design is required and they are
relatively inflexible to cover errors in a wide range of hardware structures. A more
viable option is through replicating the execution of some logic units and verifying the
result, for example in several IBM systems [98, 127]. Replication can be at various
level, from a single module to an entire core. In this work our focus is computing
intensive application, and while replication is e↵ective for control-intensive processors,
the replicated logic units for either re-computing or error verification, and the overall
e↵ect is close to fully replicating most of the processor, causing excessive overhead
especially for computing intensive applications.

2.1.3

Roll-back Recovery with Disk-based Checkpointing
and Message Logging

Although error detection and correct mechanisms have been developed and integrated
into hardware circuits, such design normally requires compromise between various
aspects such as fault tolerance capability, chip real estate, energy. Higher error rate
due to the increase of system scale and decrease of chip density requires more complex
ECC, and computing intensive application like dense linear algebra operations makes
replication based method only theoretically possible due to the energy expense
10

constrain. To complement such situation, fault tolerance method has been devised at
the software level. Such methods include checkpointing (disk and diskless), message
logging, compiler based technique, algorithm based fault tolerance (ABFT), to natural
fault tolerance. Similar to the coding based methods in hardware, redundancy is
also used in software fault tolerance methods such that lost data can be restored
and application execution can be resumed. The key concept for execution recovery
is consistent system states, which, for a distributed memory system using message
passing interface (MPI) libraries for communication, consist of the local states on
all nodes such as memory space, registers, etc., and “on-the-fly” messages. With a
consistent system state available, the application execution can recover from failure
by using the Checkpoint-and-Restart method, or C/R. A comprehensive survey of
C/R can be found in [54].
Message logging based rollback recovery works with the assumption of piecewise
deterministically [39] and performs recovery by replaying messages in the exact
original order for the failed process. This way a process can be rolled back to its state
right before failure even if no checkpoint is available. Message logging has flavors
such as pessimistic logging, optimistic logging and casual logging, depending on the
treatment to the existence of orphan process and recovery overhead [7]. In general,
message logging fits applications that perform constant interact with input and output
devices which cannot be rolled back using checkpointing at time of failure [56].
For automatic/transparent fault tolerance of MPI applications, message logging is
recommended because of the high overhead of coordinated checkpointing which puts
large stress on stable storage devices during checkpointing [24, 83]. However for dense
linear algebra application, disk-based checkpointing can be replaced with diskless
checkpointing, and user can relatively easily select the appropriate checkpoint location
such that overhead can be largely lowered.
What further attracts application developers is checkpointing-only fault tolerance.
When applicable, this requires much less development e↵ort in contrast to complex
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message logging system. Checkpointing can be performed transparently by infrastructure systems, which reportedly still remains the most popular fault tolerance
mechanism on large scale system [1], or at application level explicitly.
In checkpointing, processes periodically saves their states to stable storage. These
saved states should provide sufficient information to recover program execution. Two
main categories of checkpointing are coordinated and uncoordinated checkpointing.
In uncoordinated protocol, processes take checkpoint independently, which may
prevent excessive overhead due to synchronization, but could lead to the domino
e↵ect [34] when consistent system state cannot be achieved, and all processes are
forced to roll back to the initial state of the computation, losing all checkpoint and
useful work performed till the failure occurs.
To avoid the disastrous result of domino e↵ect in recovery, methods such as
coordinated checkpointing [10] and communication-induced checkpointing [6], have
been developed such that valid consistent state is guaranteed to exist regardless
of the failure moment and location.

In coordinated checkpointing, system-wide

checkpointing is taken at a certain interval after all processes are synchronized. Checkpointing can be performed in system-level (for example, [64, 115]) or user/application
level [108, 137].
For systems that use disk as storage media, performance overhead mostly comes
from the I/O operations which save and load checkpoints data from “stable storage”,
other overhead including the time to restart the running environment, such as MPI,
as discussed in [21].
To reduce such overhead, several methods have been developed, such as incremental checkpointing [67], forked (copy-on-write) checkpointing [84], memory
exclusion [108]. With the fast increasing of number of nodes/cores, stable storage
medium is still easily outnumbered and causing large overhead.
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2.1.4

Diskless Checkpointing

To e↵ectively reduce the checkpointing overhead, Plank proposed diskless checkpointing where “stable disk” is replaced by memory as the checkpoint storage media [109,
110].

In diskless checkpointing, processor redundancy, memory redundancy and

failure coverage are traded o↵ so that no stable storage is necessary to recover
from failure.

In applications, diskless checkpointing has been adopted to make

several matrix operations fault tolerant to single hard error [81] with low overhead.
Parity based checksum (XOR of bits in floating point numbers) is generated prior
to computation, and is updated if data has changed in the each iterations. This
checkpointing method is more suitable for applications that modify small amount of
memory between iterations, such as the left-looking LU factorization, which however
has lower performance than the right looking version that modifies large memory area
in each iteration. For these algorithms, checksum and reverse computation methods
are used to reduce memory usage.
The performance of di↵erent diskless checkpointing schemes are studied in [35,
125]. In [125], neighbour- and parity-based diskless checkpointing are implemented
and evaluated on their Xplorer Parsytec machine with 8 transputers (T805) with
various application benchmarks, such as NBODY, SOR and NQUEEN. Neighbourbased method (also called “checkpoint mirroring”) stores checkpoints into its own
physical memory and that of its neighbours’, while parity-based method uses extra
a processor called “parity processor” that keeps the parity checkpoint (XOR) of all
local checkpoints taken by the each process. Their experiment results show that
neighbour-based checkpoint has much better performance than the parity scheme
at the cost of higher memory requirement. Similar result is report in [110] that
neighbour based scheme has lower overhead if local checkpoints are store on disk. It
is worth noting that since neighbour based method cannot tolerate total failures of the
system, it should be used together with other checkpointing scheme, for example as
shown in [135], where a two-level method is proposed in which diskless checkpointing
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is used to tolerate the more probable single failures, while traditional disk based
checkpointing is adopted for the less probable multiple failures. The objective of such
design is to minimize the average fault tolerant overhead.

2.1.5

Algorithm Based Fault Tolerance

Algorithm Based Fault Tolerance (ABFT), which initially stemmed from the e↵ort
of mitigating silent error in systolic arrays [79], was introduced to further reduce
the overhead of fault tolerance on modern computing systems. ABFT maintains
consistency between the checksum and compute data by applying appropriate
mathematical operations to both parties. Typically, for linear algebra operations,
the input matrix is extended with supplementary columns and/or rows containing
checksums. This initial encoding happens only once; the matrix algorithms are
designed/modified to work on the encoded checksum along with matrix data, which
enables invariant the checksum’s relationship with the data during the course of the
algorithm. Should some data be damaged by failures, it is then possible to recover
the application by inverting the checksum operation to recreate missing data. The
overhead of ABFT is usually low, since no periodical global checkpoint or rollbackrecovery is involved during computation and the computation complexity of the
checksum operations scales similarly to the related matrix operation. ABFT and
diskless checkpointing have been combined to apply to basic matrix operations like
matrix-matrix multiplication [20, 31, 32, 33]. ABFT has also been implemented for
the High Performance Linpack (HPL) [40] and the Cholesky factorization [72] for
fail-stop failure. Both Cholesky and HPL have the same factorization structure,
where only half of the factorization result is required, and the update to the trailing
matrix is based on the fact that the left factor result is a triangular matrix. This
approach however does not necessarily apply to other factorizations, like QR where
the left factor matrix is full, neither when the application requires both left and right
factorization results. We have shown in [49], using the LU and QR factorization as
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examples, a full matrix protection solution with low space and time overhead for hard
error.
Using ABFT to mitigate single soft errors in dense matrix factorization has been
explored in [89, 90]. Later, this was extended to multiple errors [9, 61, 107] by
adopting techniques from finite-field based error correcting code (ECC), such as ReedSolomon [113] and BCH [19, 77]. While mathematically these methods can detect
and correct single and multiple soft errors, they su↵er major limitation because of the
assumption that all computation is carried out with exact arithmetics, which cannot
be fulfilled by modern computers that use floating point number. For instance, in [61],
j n is used as weights for the weighted checksum generation, where j and n are integers.
Such calculation could easily cause problems like overflow, cancellation and large
round-o↵ error with large computing scale and matrices. Realizing this limitation, [62]
has proposed a solution that uses rational number, rather than integers, as weights
to reduce the dynamic range expansion problem pointed out by [25, 26, 90], and
a decoding technique that is an exact analogue of that of the BCH codes for two
errors. In [62], however, all calculations are still assumed to be performed using
“exact rational arithmetic”. In addition, no discussion is given on how to extend to
more than two errors, nor did it cover another limitation of this ABFT checksum
based method, the left factor. Similar to the hard error case, ABFT only maintains
relationship between the checksum and the right factor. For the concern of the
left factor, backward error assertions based methods [18, 60] has been introduced to
correct erroneous solution of linear system solver that is based on LU factorization.
In [18] it is shown that transient errors during factorization could slip through the
ABFT checksum verification, making ABFT-only method unreliable, and iterative
refinement is used to correct errors in solution x. This method is e↵ective for small
error, and is extended in [60] with a large error (LE) detection and correction scheme
which has O(n2 ) computational complexity and improved the error coverage. Errors
not correctable in this algorithm is signaled. In a series of work by Du et al.[50, 52, 53],
it has been shown that in the presence of round-o↵ error on large scale and hybrid
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system with accelerators like the GPGPUs, soft errors in both the left and right
factors in DLA operations can be detected and corrected.

2.1.6

Other Methods For Soft Error

Recently, Fiala et al.

has shown a method that uses TMR(triple modular

redundancy) [58], C/R, and explicit memory locking [59] to guard memory for soft
error mitigation. These methods do not su↵er from round-o↵ error but demand
considerable extra resources and are difficult to extend to devices like cache and
systems with GPGPU, especially for computation intensive applications like DLA
operations. Also, an on-line soft error detection scheme has been devised to work on
matrix-matrix multiplication using both CPU-only system and hybrid systems with
GPGPU [42]. Experimental result on NVIDIA Tesla S1070 GPUs shows that the
online error correction overhead is much lower than that of TMR and traditional
ABFT. It is yet to show how this mechanism could be extended to more complex
matrix operations.

2.2

Fundamental Questions

Facing the complexity of HPC system error, we identify the following fundamental
questions that are to be addressed to fully understand and better design fault tolerant
algorithms. For clarity, we use System Error (SE) to refer to both hard and soft errors.
1. How does SE a↵ect DLA operations?
2. How to detect and locate the occurrence of SE?
3. How to recover from SE?
SE a↵ects computation in very di↵erent ways. Time and location are two of the
main focuses. A typical time issue has been discussed in [49] where the time of SE
leads to di↵erent recovery method. And an example of how location of SE a↵ect fault
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tolerant algorithm design is demonstrated in [50] where soft error in the upper and
lower triangular requires di↵erent protection strategies. Another important location
issue is the bit flip location within floating point number. With the IEEE-754 format,
even a single bit flip could lead to large quantity change to the floating point number
and since most of the current ABFT algorithms uses SUM-based checkpointing, the
extent to which ABFT detection and recovery are still e↵ective will be quantified.
It is straightforward to see that the detection and locating of soft errors are more
difficult than that for hard error, for which we assume that the failed process is
reported by the supporting Infrastructure of MPI in the form of MPI process ID. No
such assumption is to be made for soft error. To worsen the situation, since soft error
is hard to spot instantaneously when it strikes, it participates the DLA operation and
causes more damage than the initial bit flip error. The recovery of DLA operation
result needs to reconstruct the correct solution from such erroneous result and manage
a lower recovery cost than re-computing the solution from scratch.

2.3

Error Model

In this work, we use the following error model:
• Hard Error: Fail-stop failure causes one MPI process to stop executing and
responding to communication with other MPI processes. All content in the
failed MPI process’s memory is lost such as the running stack and matrix data.
• Soft Error: Soft error appears silently and permanently changes the value of
floating point number stored in the main memory. We use “soft error” and
“transient error” interchangeably in this text.
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Chapter 3
Hard Error Resilience on
Distributed Memory System
3.1

Introduction

While many types of failures can strike a distributed system [65], the focus of this
chapter is on the most common representation: the fail-stop model. In this model,
a failure is defined as a process that completely and definitely stops responding,
triggering the loss of a critical part of the global application state. To be more
realistic, we assume a failure could occur at any moment and can a↵ect any parts
of the application’s data. We introduce a new generic hybrid approach based on
algorithm-based fault tolerance (ABFT) that can be applied to several ubiquitous
one-sided dense linear factorizations. Using one of these factorizations, namely LU
with partial pivoting, which is significantly more challenging due to pivoting, we
theoretically prove that this scheme successfully applies to the three well known onesided factorizations, Cholesky, LU and QR. To validate these claims, we implement
and evaluate this generic ABFT scheme with both the LU and QR factorizations. A
significant contribution of this chapter is to protect the part of the matrix below

18

the diagonal (referred to as “the left factor” in the rest of the text) during the
factorization, which was hitherto never achieved.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 3.2 presents background
and prior work in the domain; Section 3.3 reviews the features of full factorizations.
Section 3.4 discusses the protection of the right factor using the ABFT method.
Section 3.5 reviews the idea of vertical checkpointing and proposes the new
checkpointing method to protect the left factor. Section 3.6 shows how Checkpointon-Demand is integrated to provide the fault tolerance support from the MPI
infrastructure. Section 3.7 evaluates the performance and overhead of the proposed
algorithm using the example of LU and QR, and section 5.8 concludes the chapter.

3.2

Algorithm Based Fault Tolerance Background

The most well-known fault-tolerance technique for parallel applications, checkpointrestart (C/R), encompasses two categories, the system and application level. At the
system level, message passing middleware deals with faults automatically, without
intervention from the application developer or user ([23, 27]). At the application
level, the application state is dumped to a reliable storage when the application
code mandates it. Even though C/R bears the disadvantage of high overhead while
writing data to stable storage, it is widely used nowadays by high end systems [1]. To
reduce the overhead of C/R, diskless checkpointing [88, 110] has been introduced to
store checksum in memory rather than stable storage. While diskless checkpointing
has shown promising performance in some applications (for instance, FFT in [55]),
it exhibits large overheads for applications modifying substantial memory regions
between checkpoints [110], as is the case with factorizations.
In contrast, Algorithm Based Fault Tolerance (ABFT) is based on adapting the
algorithm so that the application dataset can be recovered at any moment, without
involving costly checkpoints. ABFT was first introduced to deal with silent error in
systolic arrays [79]. Unlike other methods that treat the recovery data and computing
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data separately, ABFT approaches are based on the idea of maintaining consistency
of the recovery data, by applying appropriate mathematical operations on both the
original and recovery data. Typically, for linear algebra operations, the input matrix
is extended with supplementary columns and/or rows containing checksums. This
initial encoding happens only once; the matrix algorithms are designed to work on
the encoded checksum along with matrix data, similar mathematical operations are
applied to both the data and the checksum so that the checksum relationship is
kept invariant during the course of the algorithm. Should some data be damaged
by failures, it is then possible to recover the application by inverting the checksum
operation to recreate missing data. The overhead of ABFT is usually low, since no
periodical global checkpoint or rollback-recovery is involved during computation and
the computation complexity of the checksum operations scales similarly to the related
matrix operation. ABFT and diskless checkpointing have been combined to apply to
basic matrix operations like matrix-matrix multiplication [20, 31, 32, 33] and have
been implemented on algorithms similar to those of ScaLAPACK [15], which is widely
used for dense matrix operations on parallel distributed memory systems.
Recently, ABFT has been applied to the High Performance Linpack (HPL) [40]
and to the Cholesky factorization [72]. Both Cholesky and HPL have the same
factorization structure, where only half of the factorization result is required, and
the update to the trailing matrix is based on the fact that the left factor result
is a triangular matrix. This approach however does not necessarily apply to other
factorizations, like QR where the left factor matrix is full, nor when the application
requires both the left and right factorization results. Also, LU with partial pivoting,
when applied to the lower triangular L, potentially changes the checksum relation
and renders basic checkpointing approaches useless.
The generic ABFT framework for matrix factorizations we introduce in this
chapter can be applied not only to Cholesky and HPL, but also to LU and QR.
The right factor is protected by a traditional ABFT checksum, while the left
factor is protected by a novel vertical checkpointing scheme, making the resulting
20

approach an hybrid between ABFT and algorithm driven checkpointing. Indeed,
this checkpointing algorithm harnesses some of the properties of the factorization
algorithm to exchange limited amount of rollback with the ability to overlap the
checkpointing of several panel operations running in parallel. Other contributions of
this chapter include correctness proofs and overhead characterization for the ABFT
approach on the most popular 2D-block cyclic distribution (as opposed to the 1D
distributions used in previous works). These proofs consider the e↵ect of failures
during critical phases of the algorithm, and demonstrate that recovery is possible
without su↵ering from error propagation

3.3

Full Factorizations of Matrix

In this chapter, we consider the case of factorizations where the lower triangular part
of the factorization result matters, as is the case in QR and LU with pivoting. For
example, the left factor Q is required when using QR to solve the least square problem,
and so is L when solving Ak x = b with the “LU factorization outside the loop”
method [68]. In the remaining of this section, we recall the main algorithm of the most
complex case of one-sided factorization, block LU with pivoting. Additionally, we
highlight challenges specific to this type of algorithms, when compared to algorithms
studied in previous works.
Panel
Factorization

Pivoting to
the Left

Pivoting to
the Right

Triangular
Solver

Trailing
Update

Figure 3.1: Steps applied to the input matrix in an iteration of the LU factorization;
Green: Just finished; Red & Orange: being processed; Gray: Finished in previous
iterations
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Figure 3.1 presents the diagram of the basic operations applied to the input matrix
to perform the factorization. The block LU factorization algorithm can be seen as
a recursive process. At each iteration, the panel factorization is applied on a block
column. This panel operation factorizes the upper square (selecting adequate pivots
and applying internal row swapping as necessary to ensure numerical stability), and
scales the lower polygon accordingly. The output of this panel is used to apply row
swapping to the result of previous iterations, on the left, and to the trailing matrix on
the right. The triangular solver is applied to the right of the factored block to scale
it accordingly, and then the trailing matrix is updated by applying a matrix-matrix
multiply update. Then the trailing matrix is used as the target for the next iteration
of the recursive algorithm, until the trailing matrix is empty. Technically, each of
these basic steps is usually performed by applying a parallel Basic Linear Algebra
Subroutine (PBLAS).
The structure of the other one-sided factorizations, Cholesky and QR, are similar
with minor di↵erences. In the case of Cholesky, the trailing matrix update involves
only the upper triangle, as the lower left factor is not critical.

For QR, the

computation of pivots and the swapping are not necessary as the QR algorithm is
more stable. Moreover, there are a significant number of applications, like iterative
refinement and algorithms for eigenvalue problems, where the entire factorization
result, including the lower part, is needed.

Therefore, a scalable and efficient

protection scheme for the lower left triangular part of the factorization result is
required.
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3.4

Protection of the Right Factor Matrix with
ABFT

In this section, we detail the ABFT approach that is used to protect the upper triangle
from failures, while considering the intricacies of typical block cyclic distributions and
failure detection delays.

3.4.1

Checksum Relationship

ABFT approaches are based upon the principle of keeping an invariant bijective
relationship between protective supplementary blocks and the original data through
the execution of the algorithm, by the application of numerical updates to the
checksum. In order to use ABFT for matrix factorization, an initial checksum is
generated before the actual computation starts. In future references we use G to
refer to the generator matrix, and A to the original input matrix. The checksum C
for A is produced by
C = GA or C = AG

(3.1)

When G is all-1 vector, the checksum is simply the sum of all data items from a
certain row or column. Referred to as the checksum relationship, (3.1) can be used
at any step of the computation for checking data integrity (by detecting mismatching
checksum and data) and recovery (inverting the relation builds the di↵erence between
the original and the degraded dataset). With the type of failures we consider (FailStop), data cannot be corrupted, so we will use this relationship to implement
the recovery mechanism only.

This relationship has been shown separately for

Cholesky [72], and HPL [40], both sharing the property of updating the trailing matrix
with a lower triangular matrix. However, in this chapter we consider the general case
of matrix factorization algorithms, including those where the full matrix is used for
trailing matrix updates (as is the case for QR and LU with partial pivoting). In this
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context, the invariant property has not been demonstrated; we will now demonstrate
that it holds for full matrix based updates algorithms as well.

3.4.2

Checksum Invariant with Full Matrix Update

In [89], ZU is used to represent a matrix factorization (optionally with pairwise
pivoting for LU), where Z is the left matrix (lower triangular in the case of Cholesky
or full for LU and QR) and U is an upper triangular matrix. The factorization is
then regarded as the process of applying a series of matrices Zi to A from the left
until Zi Zi

1

· · · Z0 A becomes upper triangular.

Theorem 3.4.1. Checksum relationship established before ZU factorization is maintained during and after factorization.
Proof. Suppose data matrix A 2 R
R

n⇥n

n⇥n

is to be factored as A = ZU , where Z and U 2

and U is an upper triangular matrix. A is checkpointed using generator matrix

G2R

n⇥nc

, where nc is the width of checksum. To factor A into upper triangular

form, a series of transformation matrices Zi is applied to A (with partial pivoting in
LU).
Case 1: No Pivoting

U = Z n Zn

1

. . . Z1 A

Now the same operation is applied to Ac = [A, AG]

Uc = Z n Z n
= [Zn Zn

1

. . . Z1 [A, AG]

1

. . . Z1 A, Zn Zn

= [U, U G]
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1

. . . Z1 AG]

For any k  n, using U k to represent the result of U at step k,
Uck = Zk Zk

1

. . . Z1 [A, AG]

= [Zk Zk 1 . . . Z1 A, Zk Zk
⇥
⇤
= U k, U kG

1

. . . Z1 AG]

Case 2: With partial pivoting:
Uck = Zk Pk Zk 1 Pk
= [Zk Pk Zk 1 Pk

1

. . . Z1 P1 [A, AG]

1

. . . Z1 P1 A,

Z k P k Z k 1 Pk
⇥
⇤
= U k, U kG

1

. . . Z1 P1 AG]

Therefore the checksum relationship holds for LU with partial pivoting, Cholesky
and QR factorizations.

3.4.3

Checksum Invariant in Block Algorithms

Theorem 3.4.1 shows the mathematical checksum relationship in matrix factorizations. However, in real-world, HPC factorizations are performed in block algorithms,
and execution is carried out in a recursive way.

Linear algebra packages, like

ScaLAPACK, consist of several function components for each factorization. For
instance, LU has a panel factorization, a triangular solver and a matrix-matrix
multiplication. We need to ensure that the checksum relationship also holds for block
algorithms, both at the end of each iteration, and after the factorization is completed.
Theorem 3.4.2. For ZU factorization in block algorithm, checksum at the end of each
iteration only covers the upper triangular part of data that has already been factored
and are still being factored in the trailing matrix.
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Proof. Input Matrix A is split into blocks of data of size nb ⇥ nb (Aij , Zij , Uij ), and
the following stands:
2
4

A11 A12 A13
A21 A22 A23

3

2

5=4

Z11 Z12
Z21 Z22

32
54

U11 U12 U13
0

U22 U23

3

5,

(3.2)

where A13 = A11 + A12 , and A23 = A21 + A22 .
Since A13 = Z11 U13 + Z12 U23 , and A23 = Z21 U13 + Z22 U23 , and using the relation
8
>
>
A11
>
>
>
>
< A
12
>
>
A21
>
>
>
>
: A
22

= Z11 U11
= Z11 U12 + Z12 U22
= Z21 U11
= Z21 U12 + Z22 U22

in (3.2), we have the following system of equations:
8
<Z (U + U
21
11
12
:Z (U + U
11

11

12

Z11 Z12

32

U13 ) = Z22 (U23

U22 )

U13 ) = Z12 (U23

U22 )

This can be written as:

2
4

Z21 Z22
2

For LU, Cholesky and QR, 4

54

U11 + U12

Z11 Z12

(U23
3

U13
U22 )

3

5=0

2

5 is always nonsingular, so 4

U11 + U12

U13

3

5=

Z21 Z22
U23 U22
8
< U +U
11
12 = U13
0, and
.
:
U23 = U22
This shows that after ZU factorization, checksum blocks cover the upper
triangular matrix U only, even for the diagonal blocks. At the end of each iteration,
for example the first iteration in (3.2), Z11 , U11 , Z21 and U12 are completed, and U13
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is already U11 + U12 . The trailing matrix A22 is updated with
A22 0 = A22

Z21 U12 = Z22 U22 .

and A23 is updated to
A23 0 = A23

Z21 U13

= A21 + A22

Z21 (U11 + U12 )

= Z21 U11 + A22
= A22

Z21 U11

Z21 U12

Z21 U12 = Z22 U22

Therefore, at the end of each iteration, data blocks that have already been and are
still being factored remain covered by checksum blocks.
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Figure 3.2: Example of a 2D block-cyclic data distribution

3.4.4

Issues with Two-Dimensional Block-cyclic Distribution

It has been well established that data layout plays an important role in the
performance of parallel matrix operations on distributed memory systems [37, 82].
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In 2D block-cyclic distributions, data is divided into equally sized blocks, and all
computing units are organized into a virtual two-dimension grid P by Q. Each data
block is distributed to computing units in round robin following the two dimensions
of the virtual grid. Figure 3.2 is an example of a P = 2, Q = 3 grid applied
to a global matrix of 4 ⇥ 4 blocks. The same color represents the same process
while numbering in Aij indicates the location in the global matrix. This layout
helps with load balancing and reduces data communication frequency, because in
each step of the algorithm, many computing units can be engaged in computations
concurrently, and communications pertaining to blocks positioned on the same unit
can be grouped. Thanks to these advantages, many prominent software libraries (like
ScaLAPACK [45]) assume a 2D block-cyclic distribution.
"

!

#

"

!

#

"

!

#

"
!
"
!
"

Figure 3.3: Holes in a checksum protected matrix caused by a single failure and the
naive checksum duplication protection scheme (3x2 process grid)
However, with a 2D block-cyclic data distribution, the failure of a single process,
usually a computing node which keeps several non-contiguous blocks of the matrix,
results in holes scattered across the whole matrix. Figure 3.3 is an example of a 5 ⇥ 5
blocks matrix (on the left) with a 2 ⇥ 3 process grid. Red blocks represent holes
caused by the failure of the single process (1, 0). In the general case, these holes can
impact both checksum and matrix data at the same time.
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3.4.5

Checksum Protection Against Failure

Our algorithm works under the assumption that any process can fail and therefore
the data, including the checksum, can be lost. Rather than forcing checksum and
data on di↵erent processes and assuming only one would be lost, as in [40], we put
checksum and data together in the process grid and design the checksum protection
algorithm accordingly.
Minimum Checksum Amount for Block Cyclic Distributions
Theoretically, the sum-based checksum Ck of a series of N blocks Ai , 1  i  N ,
where N is the total number of blocks in one row/column of the matrix, is computed
by:

Ck =

N
X

Ak

(3.3)

k=1

With the 2D block-cyclic distribution, a single failure punches multiple holes in
the global matrix. With more than one hole per row/column, Ck in (3.3) is not
sufficient to recover all lost data. A slightly more sophisticated checksum scheme is
required.
Theorem 3.4.3. Using sum-based checkpointing, for N data items distributed in
block-cyclic onto Q processes, the size of the checksum to recover from the loss of one
process is d N
e
Q
Proof. With 2D block-cyclic, each process gets d N
e items. At the failure of one
Q
process, all data items in the group held by the process are lost. Take data item ai ,
1  i  dN
e, from group k, 1  k  Q. To be able to recover ai , any data item
Q
in group k cannot be used, so at least one item from another group is required to
create the checksum, and this generates one additional checksum item. Therefore for
all items in group k, d N
e checksum items are generated so that any item in group k
Q
can be recovered.
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Applying this theorem, we have the following checksum algorithm: Suppose Q
processes are in a process column or row, and let each process have K blocks of data
of size nb ⇥ nb. Without loss of generality, let K be the largest number of blocks
owned by any of the Q processes. From Theorem 3.4.3, the size of the checksum in
this row is K blocks.
Let Ci be the ith checksum item, and Aji , be the ith data item on process j,
1  i  dN
e, 1  j  Q:
Q
Ck =

Q
X

Akk

(3.4)

k=1

Under (3.4), we have the following corollary:
Corollary 3.4.4. The ith block of checksum is calculated using the ith block of data
of each process having at least i blocks.
Checksum Duplicates
Since ABFT checksum is stored by regular processors, it has to be considered as
fragile as the matrix data. From Theorem 3.4.3 and using the same N and Q,
the total number of checksum blocks is K = d N
e. These checksum blocks can be
Q
appended to the bottom or to the right of the global data matrix accordingly, and since
checksum is stored on computing processes, these K checksum blocks are distributed
over min (K, Q) processes (see Figure 3.3). If a failure strikes any of these processes,
like (1, 0) in this example, some checksum is lost and cannot be recovered. Therefore,
checksum itself needs protection; in our work, duplication is used to protect checksum
from failure.
A straightforward way of performing duplication is to make a copy of the entire
checksum block, as illustrated by the two rightmost columns in Figure 3.3. While
simple to implement, this method su↵ers from two major defects.

First, if the

checksum width K is a multiple of Q (or P for column checksum), the duplicate
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of a checksum block is located on the same processors, defeating the purpose of
duplication. This can be solved at the cost of introducing an extra empty column
in the process grid to resolve the mapping conflict. More importantly, to maintain
the checksum invariant property, it is required to apply the trailing matrix update
on the checksum (and its duplicates) as well. From corollary 3.4.4, once all the ith
block columns on each process have finished the panel factorization (in Q step), the
ith checksum block column is no longer active in any further computation (except
pivoting) and should be excluded from the computing scope to reduce the ABFT
overhead. This is problematic, as splitting the PBLAS calls to avoid excluded columns
has a significant impact on the trailing matrix update efficiency.
Reverse Neighboring Checksum Storage
With the observation of how checksum is maintained during factorization, we
propose the following reverse neighboring checksum duplication method that allows
for applying the update in a single PBLAS call without incurring extraneous
computation.
Algorithm 1 Checksum Management
On a P ⇥ Q grid, matrix is M ⇥ N , block size is N B ⇥ N B
Ck represents the k th checksum block column
Ak represents the k th data block column
Before factorization:
Generate P
the initial checksum:
l
m
(k 1)⇥Q+Q
N
Ck = j=(k 1)⇥Q+1 Aj , k = 1, · · · , N B⇥Q
For each of Ck , make a copy of the whole block column and put right next to its
original block column
Checksum Ck and its copy are put in the k th position starting from the far right
end
Begin factorization
l m
Host algorithm starts with an initial scope of M rows and N + N
columns
Q
For each Q panel factorizations, the scope decreases M rows and 2 ⇥ N B
columns
End factorization
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Figure 3.4: Reverse neighboring checksum storage, with two checksum duplicates
per Q-wide groups
Figure 3.4 is an example of the reverse neighboring checksum method on a 2 ⇥ 3
grid. The data matrix has 8 ⇥ 8 blocks and therefore the size of checksum is 8 ⇥ 3
blocks with an extra 8 ⇥ 3 blocks copy. The arrows indicate where checksum blocks
are stored on the right of the data matrix, according to the reverse storage scheme.
For example, in the LU factorization, the first 3 block columns produce the checksum
in the last two block columns (hence making 2 duplicate copies of the checksum).
Because copies are stored in consecutive columns of the process grid, for any 2D
grid with Q > 1, the checksum duplicates are guaranteed to be stored on di↵erent
processors. The triangular solve (TRSM) and trailing matrix update (GEMM) are
applied to the whole checksum area until the first three columns are factored. In
following factorization steps, the two last block columns of checksum are excluded
from the TRSM and GEMM scope. Since TRSM and GEMM claim most of the
computation in the LU factorization, this shrinking scope greatly reduces the overhead
of the ABFT mechanism. One can note that only the upper part of the checksum
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is useful, we will explain in the next section how this extra storage can be used to
protect the lower triangular part of the matrix.

3.4.6

Delayed Recovery and Error Propagation

In this chapter, we assume that a failure can strike at any moment during the life
span of factorization operations or even the recovery process. Theorem 3.4.2 proves
that at the moment where the failure happens, the checksum invariant property is
satisfied, meaning that the recovery can proceed successfully. However, in large scale
systems, which are asynchronous by nature, the time interval between the failure and
the moment when it is detected by other processes is unknown, leading to delayed
recoveries, with opportunities for error propagation.
The ZU factorization is composed of several sub-algorithms that are called on
di↵erent parts of the matrix. Matrix multiplication, which is used for trailing matrix
updates and claims more than 95% of the execution time, has been shown to be ABFT
compatible [20] , that is to compute the correct result even with delayed recovery. One
feature that has the potential to curb this compatibility is pivoting, in LU , especially
when a failure occurs between the panel factorization and the row swapping updates,
there is a potential for destruction of rows in otherwise una↵ected blocks.
Figure 3.5 shows an example of such a case. Suppose the current panel contributes
to the ith column of checksum. When panel factorization finishes, the ith column
becomes intermediate data which does not cover any column of matrix. If a failure
at this instant causes holes in the current panel area, then lost data can be recovered
right away. Pivoting for this panel factorization has only been applied within the light
green area. Panel factorization is repeated to continue on the rest of the factorization.
However, if failure causes holes in other columns that also contribute to the ith column
of checksum, these holes cannot be recovered until the end of the trailing matrix
update. To make it worse, after the panel factorization, pivoting starts to be applied
outside the panel area and can move rows in holes into healthy area or vice versa,
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Figure 3.5: Ghost pivoting Issue
Gray: Result in previous steps
Light Green: Panel factorization result in current step
Deep Green: The checksum that protects the light green
Blue: TRSM zone Yellow: GEMM zone
Red: one of the columns a↵ected by pivoting
extending the recovery area to the whole column, as shown in red in Figure 3.5
including triangular solving area. To recover from this case, in addition to matrix
multiplication, the triangular solver is also required to be protected by ABFT.
Theorem 3.4.5. Failure in the right-hand sides of triangular solver can recover from
fail-stop failure using ABFT.
Proof. Suppose A is the upper or lower triangular matrix produced by LU factorization (non-blocked in ScaLAPACK LU), B is the right-hand side, and the triangular
solver solves the equation Ax = B.
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Supplement B with checksum generated by Bc = B ⇤ Gr to extended form B̂ =
[B, Bc ], where Gr is the generator matrix. Solve the extended triangular equation:
Axc = Bc = [B, Bc ]
) xc = A 1 ⇥ [B, Bc ]
⇥
⇤
= A 1 B, A 1 Bc
⇥
⇤
= x, A 1 BGr
= [x, xGr ]

Therefore data in the right-hand sides of the triangular solver is protected by ABFT.

With this theorem, if failure occurs during triangular solving, lost data can be
recovered when the triangular solver completes. Since matrix multiplication is also
ABFT compatible, the whole red region in Figure 3.5 can be recovered after the
entire trailing matrix update is done, leaving the opportunity for failure detection
and recovery to be delayed at a convenient moment in the algorithm.

Figure 3.6: Separation of lower and upper areas protected by checksum (green) and
checkpoint (yellow) during the course of the factorization algorithm
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3.5

Protection of the Left Factor Matrix with Qparallel Checkpoint

It has been proven in Theorem 3.4.2 that the checksum only covers the upper
triangular part of the matrix until the current panel, and the trailing matrix is
subject to future updates. This is depicted in Figure 3.6, where the green checksum
on the right of the matrix protects exclusively the green part of the matrix. Another
mechanism must be added for the protection of the left factor (the yellow area).

3.5.1

Impracticability of ABFT for Left Factor Protection

The most straightforward idea, when considering the need of protecting the lower
triangle of the matrix, is to use an approach similar to the one described above, but
column-wise. Unfortunately, such an approach is difficult, if not impossible in some
cases, as proved in the remaining of this Section.
Pivoting and Vertical Checksum Validity
In LU, partial pivoting prevents the left factor from being protected through ABFT.
The most immediate reason is as follow: The PBLAS kernel used to compute the panel
factorization (see Figure 3.1) performs simultaneously the search for the best pivot
in the column and the scaling of the column with that particular pivot. If applied
directly on the matrix and the checksum blocks, similarly to what the trailing update
approach does, checksum elements are at risk of being selected as pivots, which results
in exchanging checksum rows into the matrix. This difficulty could be circumvented
by introducing a new PBLAS kernel that does not search for pivots in the checksum.
Unfortunately, legitimate pivoting would still break the checksum invariant
property, due to row swapping. In LU, for matrix A,
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To protect L11 and L21 , imagine that we maintain a separate checksum, stored at
the bottom of the matrix, as shown in the yellow bottom rectangle of Figure 3.6, that
we plan on updating by scaling it accordingly to the panel operation. In this vertical
checksum, each P tall group of blocks in the 2D block cyclic distribution is protected
by a particular checksum block. Suppose rows i1 and i2 reside on blocks ki1 and kj1
of two processes. It is not unusual that ki1 6= kj1 . By Corollary 3.4.4, block ki1 and
kj1 contribute to column-wise checksum block ki1 and kj1 respectively in the column
that local blocks ki1 and kj1 belong to. This relationship is expressed as
row i1 7! checksum block ki1
row j1 7! checksum block kj1
7! reads ’contributes to’. After the swapping, the relationship should be updated to
row i1 7! checksum block kj1
row j1 7! checksum block ki1
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This requires a re-generation of checksum blocks ki1 and kj1 in order to maintain
the checkpoint validity. Considering there are nb potential pivoting operations per
panel, hence a maximum of nb + 1 checksum blocks to discard, this operation has the
potential to be as expensive as computing a complete vertical checkpoint.
QR Factorization
Although QR has no pivoting, it still cannot benefit from ABFT to cover Q, as we
prove below.
Theorem 3.5.1. Q in Householder QR factorization cannot be protected by performing factorization along with the vertical checksum.
Proof. Append a m⇥n nonsingular matrix
2 A
3 with checksum GA of size c⇥n along the
column direction to get matrix Ac = 4
A has a QR factorization Q0 R0 .

A

5. G is c ⇥ m generator matrix. Suppose
GA

Perform QR factorization to Ac :
2
4

A

3

2
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3

Q
Qc12
R
5 = Qc Rc = 4 c11
5 4 c11 5
GA
Qc21 Qc22
?

Qc11 is m⇥m and Qc21 is c⇥m. Rc is m⇥n and ? represents c⇥n zero matrix. Rc 6= 0
and is full rank. Because Rc is upper triangular with nonzero diagonal elements and
therefore nonsingular.
2

Qc QTc = 4

Qc11 Qc12
Qc21 Qc22

32
54

QTc11

QTc21

QTc12

QTc22

3

5=I

Therefore
Qc11 QTc11 + Qc12 QTc12 = I.
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(3.5)

Since A = Qc11 Rc11 and Rc11 is nonsingular, then Qc11 6= 0 and nonsingular.
Assume Qc12 = 0:
Qc11 QTc21 + Qc12 QTc22 = 0, therefore Qc11 QTc21 = 0. We have shown that Qc11
is nonsingular, so QTc21 = 0 and this conflicts with GA = Qc21 Rc11 6= 0, so the
assumption Qc12 = 0 does not hold. From (3.5), Qc11 QTc11 6= I. This means even
though A = Qc11 Rc11 , Qc11 Rc11 is not a QR factorization of A.

3.5.2

Panel Checkpointing

Given that the ZU factorization cannot protect Z by applying ABFT in the same
way as for U , separate e↵orts are needed. For the rest of this chapter, we use the
term “checksum” to refer to the ABFT checksum, generated before the factorization,
that is maintained by the application of numerical updates during the course of
the algorithm, in contrast to “checkpointing” for the operation that creates a new
protection block during the course of the factorization. LU factorization with partial
pivoting being the most complex problem, it is used here for the discussion. The
method proposed in this section can be applied to the QR and Cholesky factorizations
with minimal e↵orts nonetheless.
In a ZU block factorization using 2D cyclic distribution, once a panel of Z is
generated, it is stored into the lower triangular region of the original matrix. For
example, in LU , vectors of L, except the diagonal ones, are stored in L. These lower
triangular parts from the panel factorization are final results, and are not subject to
further updates during the course of the algorithm, except for partial pivoting row
swapping in LU. Therefore only one vertical checkpointing “should be” necessary to
maintain each panel’s safety, as is discussed in [40]. We will show how this idea, while
mathematically trivial, needs to be refined to support partial pivoting. We will then
propose a novel checkpointing scheme, leveraging properties of the block algorithm to
checkpoint Z in parallel, that demonstrates a much lower overhead when compared
to this basic approach.
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3.5.3

Postponed Left Pivoting

Although once a panel is factored, it is not changed until the end of the computation,
row swaps incurred by pivoting are still to be applied to the left factor as the
algorithm progresses in the trailing matrix, as illustrated in Figure 3.1. The second
step (pivoting to the left) swaps two rows to the left of the current panel. The same
reasoning as presented in section 3.5.1 holds, meaning that the application of pivoting
row swaps to the left factor has the potential to invalidate checkpoint blocks. Since
pivoting to the left is carried out in every step of LU, this causes significant checkpoint
maintenance overhead.
Unlike pivoting to the right, which happens during updates and inside the panel
operation, whose result are reused in following steps of the algorithm, pivoting to
the left can be postponed. The factored L is stored in the lower triangular part of
the matrix without further usage during the algorithm. As a consequence, we delay
the application of all left pivoting to the end of the computation, in order to avoid
expensive checkpoint management. We keep track of all pivoting that should have
been applied to the left factor, and when the algorithm has completed, all row swaps
are applied just in time before returning the end-result of the routine.

3.5.4

Q-Parallel Checkpointing of Z

The vertical checkpointing of the panel result requires a set of reduction operations
immediately after each panel factorization. Panel factorization is on the critical path
and has lower parallelism, compared to other routines of the factorization (such as
trailing matrix update). The panel factorization works only on a single block column
of the matrix, hence benefits from only a P degree of parallelism, in a P ⇥ Q process
grid. Checkpointing worsens this situation, because it applies to the same block
column, and is bound to the same low level of exploitable parallelism. Furthermore,
the checkpointing cannot be overlapped with the computation of the trailing matrix
update: all processes who do not appear on the same column of the process grid are
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waiting in the matrix-matrix multiply PBLAS, stalled because they require the panel
column to enter the call in order for the result of the panel to be broadcasted. If
the algorithm enters the checkpointing routine before going into the trailing update
routine, the entire update is delayed. If the algorithm enters the trailing update
before starting the checkpointing, the checksum is damaged in a way that prevents
recovering that panel, leaving it vulnerable to failures.
Our proposition is then twofold: we protect the content of the blocks before
the panel, which then enables starting immediately the trailing update without
jeopardizing the safety of the panel result. Then, we wait until sufficient checkpointing
is pending to benefit from the maximal parallelism allowed by the process grid.
Enabling Trailing Matrix Update Before Checkpointing
The major problem with enabling the trailing matrix update to proceed while the
checkpointing of the panel is not finished is that the ABFT protection of the update
modifies the checksum in a way that disables protection for the panel blocks. To
circumvent this limitation, in a P ⇥ Q grid, processes are grouped by section of width
Q, that are called a panel scope. When the panel operation starts applying to a
new section, the processes of this panel scope make a local copy of the impending
column and the associated checksum, called a snapshot. This operation involves
no communication, and features the maximum P ⇥ Q parallelism. The memory
overhead is limited, as it requires only the space for at most two extra columns to be
available at all time, one for saving the state before the application of the panel to the
target column, and one for the checksum column associated to these Q columns. The
algorithm then proceeds as usual, without waiting for checkpoints before entering
the next Q trailing updates. Because of the availability of this extra protection
column, the original checksum can be modified to protect the trailing matrix without
threatening the recovery of the panel scope, which can rollback to that previous
dataset should a failure occur.
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Q-Parallel Checkpointing
When a panel scope is completed, the P ⇥Q group of processes undergo checkpointing
simultaneously. E↵ectively, P simultaneous checkpointing reductions are taking place
along the block rows, involving the Q processes of that row to generate a new
protection block. This scheme enables the maximum parallelism for the checkpoint
operation, hence decreasing its global impact on the failure free overhead. Another
strong benefit is that it scales with the process grid perfectly, whereas regular
checkpointing su↵ers from scaling with the square root of the number of processes (as
it involves only one dimension of the process grid).
Optimized Checkpoint Storage
According to Corollary 3.4.4, starting from the first block column on the left, every Q
block columns contribute to one block column of checksum, which means that once
the factorization is done for these Q block columns, the corresponding checksum block
column becomes useless (it does not protect the trailing matrix anymore, it has never
protected the left factor, see Theorem 3.4.2). Therefore, this checksum storage space
is available for storing the resultant checkpoint block generated to protect the panel
result. Following the same policy as the checksum storage, discussed in Section 3.4.5,
the checkpoint data is stored in reverse order from the right of the checksum (see
Figure 3.4). As this part of the checksum is excluded from the trailing matrix update,
the checkpoint blocks are not modified by the continued operation of the algorithm.
Recovery
The hybrid checkpointing approach requires a special recovery algorithm. Two cases
are considered. First, when failure strikes during the trailing update, immediately
after a panel scope checkpointing. For this case, the recovery is not attempted until
the current step of the trailing update is done. When the recovery time comes, the
checksum/checkpointing on the right of the matrix matches the matrix data as if the
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initial ABFT checksum had just been performed. Therefore any lost data blocks can
be recovered by the simple reverse application of the ABFT checksum relationship.
The second case is when a failure occurs during the Q panel factorization, before
the checkpointing for this panel scope can successfully finish. In this situation, all
processes revert the panel scope columns to the snapshot copy. Holes in the snapshot
data are recreated by using the snapshot copy of the checksum, applying the usual
ABFT recovery. The algorithm is resumed in the panel scope, so that panel and
updates are applied again within the scope of the Q wide section; updates outside the
panel scope are discarded, until the pre-failure iteration has been reached. Outside the
panel scope, regular recovery mechanisms are deployed (ABFT checksum inversion for
the trailing matrix, checkpoint recovery for the left factor). When the re-factorization
of panels finishes, the entire matrix, including the checksum, is recovered back to the
correct state. The computation then resumes from the next panel factorization, after
the failing step.
Figure 3.7 shows an example of the recovery when the process (1,0) in a 2 ⇥ 3 grid
failed. It presents the di↵erence between the correct matrix dataset and the current
dataset during various steps of failure recovery as a “temperature map”, brighter
colors meaning large di↵erences and black insignificant di↵erences. The matrix size is
80 ⇥ 80 and N B = 10, therefore the checksum size is 80 ⇥ 60. Failure occurs after the
panel factorization starting at (41,41) is completed, within the Q = 3 panel scope.
First, using a fault tolerant MPI infrastructures, like FT-MPI [57], the failed process
(0,1) is replaced and reintegrates the process grid with a blank dataset, showing as
evenly distributed erroneous blocks (A). Then the recovery process starts by mending
the checksum using duplicates (B). The next step recovers the data which is outside
the current panel scope (31:80,31:60), using the corresponding checksum for the right
factor, and the checkpoints for the left factor (C). At this moment, all the erroneous
blocks are repaired, except those in the panel scope (41:80, 41:50). Snapshots are
applied to the three columns of the panel scope (31:80,31:60). Since these do not
match the state of the matrix before the failure, but a previous state, this area
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Figure 3.7: Recovery example
(matrix size 800 ⇥ 800, grid size 2 ⇥ 3, failure of process (0,1), failure step:41,
A: Failure occurs B: Checksum recovered
C: Data recovered using ABFT checksum and checkpointing output D: Three panels
restored using snapshots
appears as very di↵erent (D). Panel factorization is re-launched in the panel scope,
in the area (31:80,31:60), with the trailing update limited within this area. This
re-factorization continues until it finishes panel (41:80,41:50) and by that time the
whole matrix is recovered to the correct state (not presented, all black). The LU
factorization can then proceed normally.
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3.6

On-Demand Checkpointing using the Checkpointon-Failure Protocol

There are two critical requirements for a successful deployment of the fault tolerance
algorithm described in this chapter so far. One is a supporting MPI system that allows
returning the execution control to the application, and the other is the recovery of the
running stack of the failed process to coordinate with the survived processes to restart
the execution. The previous works by others and this chapter assume that a “high
quality implementation” of MPI exists. At the time of failure, this MPI return the
execution control to the application and provide failure information such as the rank
of the failed process. Unfortunately, the current MPI-2 standard [131] addresses this
as an optional features without providing significant help to deal with the required
type of behavior. For the current standard, process or communication failures are to
be handled as errors, and the behavior of the MPI application, after an error has been
returned, is left unspecified by the standard. Most of the implementations of the MPI
Standard have taken the path of considering process failures as unrecoverable errors,
and the processes of the application are most often killed by the runtime system when
a failure hits any of them, leaving no opportunity for the user to mitigate the impact
of failures. Some e↵orts have been undertaken to enable ABFT support in MPI. FTMPI [57] was an MPI-1 implementation which proposed to change the MPI semantic
to enable repairing communicators, thus re-enabling communications for applications
damaged by failures. This approach has proven successful and applications have
been implemented using FT-MPI. However, these modifications were not adopted by
the MPI standardization body, and the resulting lack of portability undermined user
adoption for this fault tolerant solution. In [71], the authors discuss alternative or
slightly modified interpretations of the MPI standard that enable some forms of fault
tolerance. One essential idea is that process failures happening in another MPI world,
connected only through an inter-communicator, should not prevent the continuation
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of normal operations. The complexity of this approach, for both the implementation
and users, has prevented these ideas from having a practical impact.
In [16], a Checkpoint-on-Failure (CoF) Protocol is proposed to handle the issue
of MPI support and the recovery of running stack. The core idea is to only perform
checkpointing at the time of failure in an on-demand fashion. In the CoF approach,
the only requirement from the MPI implementation is that it does not forcibly kill
the living processes without returning control. No stronger support from the MPI
stack is required, and the state of the library is left undefined.
To demonstrate the e↵ectiveness of the CoF fault-tolerance mechanism, this
section integrates CoF with the QR factorization implementation described in the
earlier sections of this chapter. While details of the modification to MPI can be
found in [16], in this section we focus on the QR factorization, especially the situation
where failure occurs during lower level routines such as PDLARFB is addressed. Such
situation has been missed in most of the related work in the area for the complexity
it introduces.

3.6.1

QR factorization on Distributed Memory System

For an M ⇥ N matrix A, QR factorization produces Q and R, such that A = QR and
Q is an M ⇥ M orthogonal matrix and R is an M ⇥ N upper triangular matrix. For
simplicity of expression, we use a square matrix M ⇥ M in this chapter, but the result
applies also to rectangular matrices. There are several methods for computing the QR
factorization, such as the Gram-Schmidt process, the Householder transformations,
and the Givens rotations. ScaLAPACK uses a block version of the QR factorization
by accumulating a few steps of the Householder matrix. This method is rich in level
3 BLAS operations and therefore can achieve high performance. Q is stored under
the lower diagonal of the input matrix in the form of a W Y representation of the
Householder transformation products[14, 116].
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ScaLAPACK implements the block QR factorization as follow. At step i , an
m ⇥ m submatrix Ai is partitioned and factorized as
h

2

i

Ai = A1 A2 = 4

A11 A12
A21 A22

3

2

5=Q⇥4

R11 R12
0

R22

3
5

Here A11 is of size nb ⇥ nb, where nb is called the block size. A21 is of size (m

nb) ⇥ nb. A1 = [A11 , A12 ]T constitutes the area for the panel QR factorization. Since
ScaLAPACK uses the Householder method, Q is expressed as a series of Householder
transformations in the form Hi = I
entries, 1 on the i

⌧i vi viT , i = 1 · · · nb. vi has 0 for the first i

1

th entry and ⌧i = 2/viT vi . In ScaLAPACK, vi is stored below

the diagonal of A and when Q is applied to the trailing matrix A2 = [A21 , A22 ]T , Q
is computed by Q = H1 · · · Hnb = I

V T V T , where T is an upper triangular matrix

of size nb ⇥ nb and V has vi as its i

th column. With this expression, the trailing

matrix update becomes
2

Ã2 = 4

Ã12
Ã22

3

5 = QT A2 = (I

V T T V T )A2

(3.6)

This finishes one iteration of the block QR factorization. This process is repeated
from Ã22 until the whole matrix is factorized.

3.6.2

Failure in PBLAS routines

An important condition for the e↵ectiveness of ABFT is the completion of the current
iteration. When a failure interrupts the program execution during an iteration, the
checksum ends up in intermediate form and as a result cannot be used for recovery.
This problem worsens when a failure occurs during a lower level routine, like a PBLAS,
causing a partial trailing matrix update. In this case, updates have been applied to
parts of the dataset, possibly without having updated accordingly the corresponding
checksums. In the case of the QR algorithm, this problem is solved by saving the
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Figure 3.8: PDLARFB
local state when a failure is detected in PDLARFB rather than in PDGEQRF. The
recovery process in this case is described as follow.
As shown in (3.6), the trailing update of QR carries out operation QT A2 = (I
V T T V T )A2 ! Ã2 . The right arrow means the updated trailing matrix replaces the
content of A2 . The trailing matrix update of QR is similar to PDGEMM for LU
which has been shown to hold the checksum relationship only at the end. Therefore
the procedure to recover from a failure in PDLARFB is:
1. Survived processes mark the progress and dump critical data to disk
2. After re-spawning, all processes dry-run to the failure point
3. All except the replacement process load checkpoint from disk
4. All processes resume computing from the failure point to the end of PDLARFB
5. At the exit of PDLARFB, recover all lost data in checksum and the whole
matrix
6. Execution of PDGEQRF returns to normal
The ’dry-run’ step is to re-establish the calling stack of all processes to the failing
point. Therefore PBLAS and ScaLAPACK routines for computing, for example,
PDGEQR2, PDLARFT, etc. are skipped over during the dry run.
48

The recovery is demonstrated with an example of a 4 ⇥ 4 blocks matrix on a 2 ⇥ 3
grid where failure occurs during PDLARFB.
PDLARFB implements QT A2 = (I
1. W

V T A2

2. W̃

TT ⇥ W

3. Ã2

A2

V T T V T )A2 in three steps:

V W̃

Suppose the failure occurs right after step 1 on process (1,0). In step 1, as shown in
figure 3.8(a), V is stored in the green trapezoid and A2 is in the yellow blocks. V is
first broadcast row-wise to all columns, then GEMM is called on each process that
owns A2 with the local V and A2 . Finally, the result is produced with column-wise
block summation and the result is stored on the first row of processes that process
the first row of A2 (blue blocks). O↵ered by the MPI CoF modification presented
in [16], the failure location is broadcasted to all surviving processes and matrix data
are dumped to the disk, including peripheral data like the TAU array and workspace.
Surviving processes also keep a record on whether they have finished the DGEMM in
step 1.
After critical data is saved to disk, the program exits and is re-spawn with a
replacement process in the failed process’s location. The re-launched program dryruns to the failure point in step 1 of PDLARFB. All previously surviving processes
load their checkpoint from disk while the replacement process stays with its blank
data. Then the program resumes execution of PDLARFB. Since failure is on process
(1,0), W survives the data loss.
Step 2 of PDLARFB is W ⇥ T where W is the blue blocks in figure 3.8(a) and T
is a nb ⇥ nb upper triangular matrix. Since T resides on each process in the row that
owns W , the correctness of T can be always guaranteed, and therefore W̃ has no lost
block in it after calling DTRMM. W̃ is broadcasted column-wise for step 3.
Step 3 of PDLARFB is shown in figure 3.8(b). In Ã2

A2

V W̃ T , besides

W̃ T , V is also correct since V has been broadcast row-wise to all process in step 1,
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therefore even if blocks of V are destroyed by the failure, the result on the replacement
process can be recovered from its neighbour processes in the same row. The result
of step 3, also that of PDLARFB, is a↵ected by the incorrect result in A2 , expressed
in shadowed blocks in figure 3.8(b). These incorrect blocks remain in the result of
DGEMM in this step. They are fixed later in the recovery process in PDGEQRF
using both the ABFT and Q-parallel checksum.
For PDLARFB, both V and T can be guaranteed correct no matter when and
where failure occurs, the only variable factor is W . However if the failure does punch
holes in W , more shadow blocks appear in the result of PDLARFB, and they can
still be fixed by the recovery in PDGEQRF.

3.7

Evaluation

In this section, we evaluate the performance of the proposed fault tolerant algorithm.
For a fault tolerant algorithm, the most important consideration is the overhead
added to failure free execution rate, due to various fault tolerance mechanisms such
as checksum generation, checkpointing and extra flops. An efficient and scalable
algorithm will incur a little overhead over the original algorithm while enabling
scalable reconstruction of lost dataset in case of failure.
We use the NSF Kraken supercomputer, hosted at the National Institute for
Computational Science (NICS, Oak Ridge, TN) as our testing platform. This machine
features 112,896 2.6GHz AMD Opteron cores, 12 cores per node, with the Seastar
interconnect. At the software level, to serve as a comparison base, we use the non
fault tolerant ScaLAPACK LU and QR in double precision with block size N B = 100.
The fault tolerance functions are implemented and inserted as drop-in replacements
for ScaLAPACK routines.
In this section, we first evaluate the storage overhead in the form of extra memory
usage, then show experimental result on Kraken to assess the computational overhead.
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3.7.1

Storage Overhead

Checksum takes extra storage (memory), but on large scale systems, memory usage
is usually maximized for computing tasks. Therefore, it is preferable to have a small
ratio of checksum size over matrix size, in order to minimize the impact on the memory
available to the application itself. For the sake of simplicity, and because of the small
impact in term of memory usage, neither the pivoting vector nor the column shift are
considered in this evaluation.
Di↵erent protection algorithms require di↵erent amounts of memory.

In the

following, we consider the duplication algorithm presented in Section 3.4.5 for
computing the upper memory bound. The storage of the checksum includes the
row-wise and column-wise checksums and a small portion at the bottom-right corner.
For an input matrix of size M ⇥ N on a P ⇥ Q process grid, the memory used
for checksum (including duplicates) is M ⇥

N
Q

⇥ 2. The ratio Rmem of checksum

memory over the memory of the input matrix, equals to

2
,
Q

becomes negligible with

the increase in the number of processes used for the computation.

3.7.2

Overhead without Failures

Figure 3.9 evaluates the completion time overhead and performance, using the LU
factorization routine PDGETRF. The performance of both the original and fault
tolerant version are presented, in Tflop/s (the two curves overlap due to the little
performance di↵erence). This experiment is carried out to test the weak scalability,
where both the matrix and grid dimension doubles. The result outlines that as
the problem size and grid size increases, the overhead drops quickly and eventually
becomes negligible. At the matrix size of 640, 000 ⇥ 640, 000, on 36, 864 (192 ⇥ 192)
cores, both versions achieved over 48Tflop/s, with an overhead of 0.016% for
the ABFT algorithm. As a side experiment, we implemented the naive vertical
checkpointing method discussed in section 3.5.2, and as expected the measured
overhead quickly exceeds 100%.
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Figure 3.9: Weak scalability of FT-LU: performance and overhead on Kraken,
compared to non fault tolerant LU
FT overhead (Tflop/s)
FT overhead (%)

0.051
26.203

0.066
10.357

0.070
3.044

0.021
0.309

0.018
0.086

0.008
0.016

As the left factor is touched only once during the computation, the approach of
checkpointing the result of a panel synchronously can, a-priori, look sound when
compared to system based checkpoint, where the entire dataset is checkpointed
periodically. However, as the checkpointing of a particular panel su↵ers from its
inability to exploit the full parallelism of the platform, it is subject to a derivative of
Amdahl’s law, its parallel efficiency is bound by P, while the overall computation
enjoys a P ⇥ Q parallel efficiency: its importance is bound to grow when the
number of computing resources increases. As a consequence, in the experiments,
the time to compute the naive checkpoint dominates the computation time. On
the other hand, the hybrid checkpointing approach exchanges the risk of a Q-step
rollback with the opportunity to benefit from a P ⇥ Q parallel efficiency for the panel
checkpointing. Because of this improved parallel efficiency, the hybrid checkpointing
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Figure 3.10: Weak scalability of FT-LU: run time overhead on Kraken when failures
strike at di↵erent steps
approach benefits from a competitive level of performance, that follows the same
trend as the original non fault tolerant algorithm.

3.7.3

Recovery Cost

In addition to the “curb” overhead of fault tolerance functions, the recovery from
failure adds extra overhead to the host algorithm. There are two cases for the recovery.
The first one is when failure occurs right after the reverse neighboring checkpointing of
Q panels. At this moment the matrix is well protected by the checksum and therefore
the lost data can be recovered directly from the checksum. We refer to this case as
“failure on Q panels border”. The second case is when the failure occurs during the
reverse neighboring checkpointing and therefore local snapshots have to be used along
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with re-factorization to recover the lost data and restore the matrix state. This is
referred to as the ”failure within Q panels”.
Figure 3.10 shows the overhead from these two cases for the LU factorization,
along with the no-error overhead as a reference. In the “border” case, the failure
is simulated to strike when the 96th panel (which is a multiple of grid columns,
6, 12, · · · , 48) has just finished. In the “non-border” case, failure occurs during the
(Q + 2)th panel factorization. For example, when Q = 12, the failure is injected when

the trailing update for the step with panel (1301,1301) finishes. From the result in
Figure 3.10, the recovery procedure in both cases adds a small overhead that also
decreases when scaled to large problem size and process grid. For largest setups, only
2-3 percent of the execution time is spent recovering from a failure.

3.7.4

Extension to Other factorization

The algorithm proposed in this chapter can be applied to a wide range of dense matrix
factorizations other than LU. As a demonstration we have extended the fault tolerance
functions to the ScaLAPACK QR factorization in double precision. Since QR uses a
block algorithm similar to LU (and also similar to Cholesky), the integration of fault
tolerance functions is mostly straightforward. Figure 3.11 shows the performance
of QR with and without recovery. The overhead drops as the problem and grid size
increase, although it remains higher than that of LU for the same problem size. This is
expected: as the QR algorithm has a higher complexity than LU ( 43 N 3 v.s. 23 N 3 ), the
ABFT approach incurs more extra computation when updating checksums. Similar
to the LU result, recovery adds an extra 2% overhead. At size 160,000 a failure incurs
about 5.7% overhead to be recovered. This overhead becomes lower, the larger the
problem or processor grid size considered.
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Figure 3.11: Weak scalability of FT-QR: run time overhead on Kraken when failures
strike

3.7.5

Checkpointing-on-Failure for QR

The CoF QR algorithm checkpoints data from memory to disk on the living processes
at the time of failure. Therefore disk I/O access time is a critical component of the
performance overhead.
To evaluate the performance impact of disk access, the implementation of the
CoF algorithm based on the ScaLAPACK QR is tested on two cluster systems at
di↵erent scale. The first machine, “Dancer”, is a 16-node cluster at the University
of Tennessee, Knoxville. All nodes are equipped with two 2.27GHz quad-core Intel
E5520 CPUs, connected by 20GB/s Infiniband. Solid State Drive disks are used as
the checkpoint storage media. The second system is the Kraken supercomputer by
Cray Inc. at the Oak Ridge National Lab. Kraken has 9,408 compute nodes. Each
node has two Istanbul 2.6 GHz six-core AMD Opteron processors, 16 GB of memory,
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Figure 3.12: Performance on Dancer (16 ⇥ 8 grid)
and a highly scalable cluster file system “Lustre”. All the nodes are Connected by
the Cray SeaStar2+ interconnect. In all experiments, the block size is set to 100.
Figure 3.12 presents the performance of this QR implementation on the Dancer
cluster with a 8 ⇥ 16 process grid. The FT-QR (no failure) presents the performance
of the On-Demand Checkpointing implementation, in a fault-free execution, while
the FT-QR (with failure) curves present the performance of the same implemenation,
when the failure is injected after the first step of PDLARFB that performs W
V T A2 . The performance of the non-fault tolerant ScaLAPACK QR is also presented
to serve as a reference.
The di↵erence with the ScaLAPACK QR is caused by the parallel-Q checksum
and the ABFT algorithm. This overhead has been shown to scale down with larger
number of processes and matrices. In the case of a run with an error, the following
overheads adds up: the times to store the checkpoint to disk, re-launch an application,
re-establish the position of all processes by dry running in the application until the
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Figure 3.13: Overhead over ScaLAPACK QR on Dancer (16 ⇥ 8 grid)
failing point, loading checkpoint from disk and perform the ABFT recovery using the
checksum found in the checkpoint of the previously living processes.
On Dancer, the performance of QR with on-demand checkpointing and recovery
follows closely with the “no failure” performance. Figure 3.13 shows that as the
matrix size increases, the recovery overhead falls below 5% more than the “no failure”
overhead. By breaking down the run-time of each recovery elements, Figure 3.14
shows that checkpoint saving and loading only take a small percentage of the total
run-time. On a problem of this size, the additional overheads are dominated by the
time it takes to terminate the failing MPI application and relaunch a new one. Other
than the fast solid state drive disks, the fast checkpointing can also be attributed
to the disk cache provided by the OS. Since loading is performed immediately after
saving, high disk cache hits can largely speed up the process. After matrix size
44,000 the memory usage on each node came close to limit and since no swap space is
available on the Dancer cluster, disk cache support started to decrease and cause slight
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Figure 3.14: Time Breakdown of FT-QR on Dancer (16 ⇥ 8 grid)
increase in disk access time, which however does not a↵ect the overhead percentage
from performing recovery.
Figure 3.15 presents the performance on Kraken with a larger grid and a di↵erent
filesystem to store the checkpoint images. A similar e↵ect of a small checkpointing
saving and loading time is observed. The performance of the “with failure” case shows
the same trend of closely following the “no failure” case performance. At size matrix
100,000 for instance, FT-QR successfully recovered from the failure and achieved 2.86
Tflop/s, which is 90% of the performance of the ScaLAPACK QR. This verified that
the On-Demand Checkpointing QR also performs well at larger scales.

3.8

Conclusion

In this chapter, by assuming a failure model in which fail-stop failures can occur
anytime on any process during a parallel execution, a general scheme of ABFT
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Figure 3.15: Performance on Kraken (24 ⇥ 24 grid)
algorithms for protecting one-sided matrix factorizations is proposed. This scheme
can be applied to a wide range of dense matrix factorizations, including Cholesky,
LU and QR. A significant property of the proposed algorithms is that both the left
and right factorization results are protected. ABFT is used to protect the right factor
with checksum generated before, and carried along during the factorizations. A highly
scalable checkpointing method is proposed to protect the left factor. This method
cooperatively reutilizes the memory space originally designed to store the ABFT
checksum, and has minimal overhead by strategically coalescing checkpoints of many
iterations. In addition, a Checkpointing-on-Failure scheme is proposed to help the
recovery of the execution under the situation that no support is officially available
from the MPI standard. By integrating the minimal support in the MPI system, diskbased checkpointing is only performed at the time of failure. Execution stack and
matrix data are later recovered from ABFT checksum and both disk- and disklesscheckpoint. Large scale experimental results validate the design of the proposed fault
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tolerance method by highlighting scalable performance and decreasing overhead for
both LU and QR.
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Chapter 4
Soft Error Resilience on
Distrbuted Memory System
4.1

Introduction

Soft errors, normally in the form of bit flips, are events in microelectronic circuit
that result in transient error without permanently damaging the device.

They

corrupt computed data, and produce erroneous results without leaving a trace.
High-end computer systems are especially susceptible to such errors due to the ever
increasing chip density and system scale. Between 2003 and 2004, the 2048-node
ASC Q supercomputer for scientific computing in Los Alamos National Laboratorys
experienced failure from extensive soft errors [100]. By comparing the error logs
with a radiation experiment conducted in a lab, the cause was later identified to
be the cosmic ray striking its parity-protected cache tag array. The Q computer is
more vulnerable to soft errors because it is located at about 7500 feet above the sea
level, and the neutrons from cosmic-rays are roughly 6.4 times stronger than the ones
occuring at sea level. A similar incident has also appeared in a commercial computing
system from Sun Microsystems that caused outages for many of its customers due to
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cosmic ray soft errors [92]. These incidents signify that soft errors are a real issue
that both hardware and software developers must face.
Soft error rate (SER) in memory is usually quantified using FIT (failure in time)
6

per MB, 1 FIT is 1 failure per 109 operation hours per 10 bits. Google has reported
between 778 and 25,000 FIT from errors in the DRAMs of their server fleet, an order
of magnitude higher than previously expected [118]. As CMOS technology scales the
feature size down with more transistors per chip and lower critical charge [75, 138],
the threat of soft errors will continue to haunt the computing community.
The three main sources of soft errors are alpha particles, high energy neutrons, and
thermal neutron flux. Threatening alpha particles primarily originate from memory
chip packages. From alpha particles, two or three atoms of uranium or thorium in a
contaminated package can already flip a bit [29]. Even though newer technology and
material can to some extent mitigate the impact of alpha particles, recent studies have
shown that with the scaling in CMOS circuit, soft error rate (SER) increases when
the critical charge is lowered. For instance, SER at 0.3V is eight times higher than
SER at 1.0V [63]. High energy neutrons from cosmic rays are the dominant cosmic
ray products that cause soft errors [145]. Neutrons can penetrate most man-made
construction, for example, five feet of concrete [97]. According to [75], CMOS scaling
does not increase the SER from neutrons, the factor of the fast increase of system
capacity in the sense of more CPU cores and memories also validate concern for the
neutrons induced soft errors. Thermal neutrons are not as problematic as the other
two sources and are mostly related to high energy neutron flux and materials in the
neighboring environment [44].
In order to mitigate the impact of soft errors, modern HPC systems rely heavily on
ECC (error correcting code). Nowadays the most commonly used ECC is SECDED
(Single Error Correction, Double Error Detection). For multi-bit errors precipitated
by the progress of the integrated circuit technology [132], a more powerful form of
ECC has become too expensive due to the higher encoding and decoding overhead
and the resulting memory performance loss. Question has been raised on whether soft
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error resilience can be achieved with less cost from the application side [70]. Among
HPC applications that could benefit from such fault tolerance capability, dense linear
algebra applications such as the HPL benchmark for the TOP500 competition [99]
and the AORSA fusion energy simulation program [11], are representative examples.
These applications normally involve solving a dense system of equations of the form
Ax = b on large scale HPC systems with matrix sizes of A as large as 500,000. Soft
errors that occur during such long running applications produce incorrect solution.
This lowers productivity by wasting valuable time and energy in error tracing with
little chance of locating the error.
Until now, most of the soft error resilience techniques for dense linear solvers are
limited to small scale computing installations, such as on systolic arrays, assuming
that the error correcting code does not seriously a↵ect system performance and the
encoding can be carried out with exact arithmetic [61, 89]. Unfortunately, none of
these assumptions hold true for today’s Pflop/s supercomputer systems. In [51], we
have demonstrated the first attempt to take on the challenge of recovering the solution
from a dense linear system solver of Ax = b with a single error occurrence in both L
and U of the LU factorization. This section develops a multiple soft errors resilience
mechanism which could potentially be a more performance friendly alternative to the
complex hardware ECC. The proposed algorithms consider the spatial and temporal
multiple errors. Spatial soft errors occur at di↵erent time, whereas temporal soft
errors manifest as simultaneous multiple bit flips in disparate locations. Experiments
on the Kraken supercomputer from Cray at the University of Tennessee verified
our design for both the error detection and correction capability as well as low
performance complexity.

The proposed method may also be extended to other

one-sided factorizations for the recovery of linear system solution and factorization
matrices.
The rest of the section is organized as follows. Section 4.2 introduces an LU
based dense linear solver on distributed memory system. The impact of soft error
on the linear solver is then analyzed and the general work flow of the proposed soft
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error resilience algorithm is shown in Section 4.3. Sections 4.4 and 4.5 develop the
protection method for both the left factor L and right factor U . Section 4.6 proposes a
block protection method to reduce the computational complexity of the non-blocking
protection algorithm for U . Finally, the recovery algorithm is discussed in Section 4.7
and the experimental results are shown in Section 4.8. Section 4.9 concludes the
section.

4.2

High Performance Linear System Solver

For dense matrix A, the LU factorization produces P A = LU (or P = ALU ),
where P is a pivoting matrix, L and U are unit lower triangular matrix and upper
triangular matrix respectively. LU factorization is popular for solving systems of
linear equations. With L and U , the linear system Ax = b is solved by Ly = b and
then U x = y. ScaLAPACK implements the right-looking version of LU with partial
pivoting based on a block algorithm and 2D block cyclic data distribution.
For an N ⇥ N matrix (or submatrix) A. Split A into 2 ⇥ 2 blocks with block size
N B. A11 has size N B ⇥N B, A12 is N B ⇥(N
is (N

N B) ⇥ (N

N B), A21 is (N

N B)⇥N B, and A22

N B), which is also known as the “trailing matrix”. Decompose

A as
2
4

A11 A12
A21 A22

3

2

5=4

L11

0

L21 L22

32
54

U11 U12
0

L22

3
5

and therefore
8 2 3 2 3
>
>
A
L
>
>
4 11 5 = 4 11 5 U11
>
>
< A
L21
21
>
>
A12 = L11 U12
>
>
>
>
:L U = A
L21 U12
22 22
22
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! P DGET F 2
! P DT RSM
! P DGEM M

(4.1)

PDGETF2, PDTRSM and PDGEMM are the names of the ScaLAPACK routines
that perform the corresponding operations on the left. This poses as one iteration
(step) of the factorization, and pivoting is applied on the left and right of the
current panel. The routines names in the ScaLAPACK LU are listed after “!”.
For description, we use Ū to represent the area of U12 modified by PDTRSM, and Ũ
for A22 in PDGEMM.
Block algorithms o↵er good granularity to benefit from high performance BLAS
routines, while 2D block-cyclic distribution ensures scalability with load balancing.

4.3

Soft Error Resilience Framework

Since soft errors occur at times and locations unknown to the host algorithm, di↵erent
methodologies are required to provide resilience to di↵erent part of the matrix. In
this section, the error propagation in LU factorization is discussed and a general work
flow of error detection and recovery is given. Details of each steps are explained in
later sections.

4.3.1

Error Pattern in the Block LU Algorithm

During the process of LU factorization, the left factor L and right factor U have
di↵erent “dynamics” with regard to the frequency of data change. For L, once a
panel is factorized, the resulted data stored under the diagonal comes to the final
form without undergoing any further changes. This o↵ers an opportunity to use the
traditional diskless checkpointing method to protect these data. ABFT cannot be
applied to the panel factorization since otherwise checksum rows for the panel could
be moved into data causing erroneous result. In LU, partial pivoting that swaps rows
of both L and U is normally utilized to provide better stability, but this pivoting
operation could break the static feature of the L data. For example, considering the
case of one soft error, two generator matrices e2 and w2 can be used in addition to
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Pivoting to
the Left

Pivoting to
the Right

Figure 4.1: Two pivoting sweeps in LU factorization
e1 and w1 used for the right factor. ei and wi are all-1 matrix and random number
matrix, respectively. For original matrix A, two rows and columns of checksum are
appended as:
0

A

B
B
B e2 A
@
w2 A

Ae1 Aw1
...
...

1
C
C
C
A

(4.2)

The left pivoting is depicted in Figure 4.1. Suppose pivoting requests exchanging
row j and k. For e2 A:
0

B
B
B
B
B
B
B
B
e2 A = (1, 1, . . . , 1) ⇥ B
B
B
B
B
B
B
@

1

0

a1·
C
B
.. C
B
B
. C
C
B
C
B
B
aj· C
C
B
.. C
B
=
(1,
1,
.
.
.
,
1)
⇥
B
. C
C
B
C
B
B
ak· C
C
B
B
.. C
C
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am·
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a1·
C
.. C
. C
C
C
ak· C
C
.. C
. C
C
C
aj· C
C
.. C
. C
A
am·

This means e2 A is immune to the left pivoting, but for w2 A this conclusion does
not hold since data in w2 are random numbers. Let w2,i be the ith element of w2 :
w2,1 a1 + w2,2 a2 + · + w2,j aj + · · · + W2,k ak + · · · + w2,m am
6= w2,1 a1 + w2,2 a2 + · + w2,j ak + · · · + W2,k aj + · · · + w2,m am
and therefore each left pivoting invalidates all previous vertical checksums.
To deal with this situation, in this work the pivoting to the factorized L is delayed
to the end of factorization. Since soft errors could strike at any moment, checkpointing
frequency as high as once per panel factorization is necessary, but this also potentially
leads to high performance overhead and therefore should be used economically. For
example, even though the factorized Ū (result of PDTRSM) also stays static once
produced, it can be protected by ABFT checksum and therefore causes less overhead.
Ũ di↵ers from L and Ū in that it undergoes changes constantly from trailing
matrix update. If soft errors alter data within Ũ , and the erroneous data are carried
along with computation to update the Ũ , even a single-bit soft error could propagate
into large area of Ũ , let alone multiple errors at di↵erent time of the factorization.
Figure 4.2 is a demonstration of such a situation. Two LU factorizations of the
same data are run. One with errors and one without error. The matrix size is 200⇥200
with block size 20. The two final results are subtracted and colored by the size of the
absolute value of the residue. The brighter the color, the larger the residue. Using
MATLAB notation, two soft errors are injected at location (50, 120) and (35, 10) right
before the panel factorization for blocks (41 : 200, 41 : 60) starts. Error at (35, 10) is
in the finished L area and therefore does not propagate. Error at (50, 120) is in the
PDTRSM area. During PDTRSM, data in column 120 gets a↵ected and this column
of errors continues into the PDGEMM area (the trailing matrix for step 40) until
PDGETF2 starts on blocks (100 : 200, 100 : 121) when errors spread out to the whole
trailing matrix (120 : 200, 120 : 200). It is worth noting that errors on the diagonals
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Figure 4.2: Error propagation
also cause the pivoting sequence to diverge from the correct sequence, and this a↵ect
the areas below row 120 of L.
From the example, it can be seen that large areas of the final L and U can be
contaminated by a single soft error, and the a↵ected area is a function of the soft error
location and timing. Available fault tolerance, like C/R and diskless checkpointing,
are not applicable because they require the location and time information of error, and
by the end of the factorization the error could have propagated into their checksum
and invalidated the redundancy for recovery.
Figure 4.3 shows an example of multiple-error propagation in a small matrix.
Gaussian elimination is applied to a 30 ⇥ 30 matrix. To simplify the illustration, no
pivoting nor block algorithm is used. Each step of the Gaussian elimination zeros out
elements below the diagonal in one column. The color scheme is the same as Figure
4.2. During the elimination, Two soft errors are injected at step 1 and 3 at location
(6,13) and (12, 18) using addition. Since both errors occur below the row 3, these
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Figure 4.3: Example of error propagation in the U result of a 30 ⇥ 30 matrix
errors fall in the Ũ area of steps 1 to 3. The two white dots at (6,13) and (12, 18) are
the initial injection locations. Starting from step 4, the trailing matrix update which
is GEMM(matrix-matrix multiple) picks up the erroneous data for computation. As
the iteration continues, the errors grow downward into the trailing matrix (in yellow).
When it reaches the diagonal, the erroneous data starts to participate in the vertical
scaling of zeroing out values below diagonals, and immediately the errors take over
the entire trailing matrix shown in red dots. Both of the two errors follow the same
propagation pattern. In the red lower right section, propagated errors from both
initial errors merge. Since the propagation occurs silently, it is challenging to detect
and recover from such situation without any sign of error.

4.3.2

General Work Flow

We proposed a hybrid method of ABFT and diskless checkpointing to protect LU
based linear solver. This method can tolerant multiple occurrences of soft error in
the whole area of factorization result and restore the correct solution x to the linear
system of equations Ax = b. The general work flow of error detection and recovery
is in Algorithm 2.
Details of Algorithm 2 will be explained in details in the coming sections.
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Algorithm 2 Fault Tolerant System Work Flow
Require: Ax = b; Generator matrix⇥G; Check matrix
H
⇤
Step 1: Checkpointing A by Ac = A A ⇥ G
Step 2: Perform LU factorization Lc Uc = P ⇥ Ac in block algorithm of block size
nb with partial pivoting; Panel factorization result in each step is checkpointed
immediately once produced
Step 3: Detect error occurrence by = kUc ⇥ Hk
if Found error(s) from > 0 then
Step 3.1: Locate initial error(s) using
Step 3.2: Detect and eliminate error(s) in L
Step 3.3: Calculate x̂ by x̂ = Û (\L̂\(P ⇥ b)), and
Step 3.4: Adjust x̂ to the correct solution x = x̂ +
else
Step 4: Reach the correct solution x = U \(L\(P ⇥ b))
end if

4.4

Detecting and Correcting Errors in L

As discussed above, diskless checkpointing is utilized to protect the left factor L from
soft errors. The objective, in addition to the error correction capabilities, is having
low performance overhead as the checkpointing is scaled to large computing scale.

4.4.1

Error Encoding for L: 1 Error Per Column

For any column of the computed left factor [a1 , a2 , · · · , ak ]T , the vertical checkpointing
produces the following two sets of checksums:
8
<

a1 + a2 + · · · + ak = c1

:w a + w a + · · · + w a = c
2,1 1
2,2 2
2,k k
2

(4.3)

Suppose aj is hit by soft error to a˜j , the new checksum suite becomes
8
<

a1 + · · · + a˜j + · · · + ak = c˜1

:w a + · · · + w a˜ + · · · + w a = c˜
2,1 1
2,j j
2,k k
2
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(4.4)

Subtract (4.4) from (4.3), we get
8
<
and therefore w2,j =

c˜2 c2
.
c˜1 c1

c˜1

:c˜

c1 = a˜j
c2 = w2,j (a˜j

2

aj
aj )

j can be determined by looking up w2,j in w2 , and the

erroneous data can be recovered from the first equation of (4.3).
The check matrix used for L is
2

H=4

1, 1, · · · , 1
w2,1 , w2,2 , · · · , w2,m

1
0

0
1

3
5

It is straightforward to see prove any two columns of H is independent given the
random numbers in the second row do not repeat. By coding theory [104] the minimal
distance of this error correcting code is 3, and therefore it can correct up to 1 error
per column. In practice, the first row of H could cause large rounding errors in the
recovery process due to floating pointing arithmetic. Another row of di↵erent random
numbers can solve the issue as long as no two column of H are linear dependent.

4.4.2

Local Checkpointing

Since the checkpointing for L is performed in each iteration for the left factor, the
scalability of such algorithm is the main concern. As already shown in Chapter 4,
global vertical checkpointing does not scale because the checkpointing operation is
implemented by the PDGEMM routine on the critical path of LU execution, which
only engages a small amount of processes in checkpointing, and the rest are stalled.
Since the left pivoting is delayed, the left factor, once computed, is not touched
any more. The communication incurred by the PDGEMM-based checkpointing can
be removed by a local checkpointing scheme.
Figure 4.4 illustrates the local checkpointing mechanism. Block size is nb ⇥ nb and
matrix has 5 ⇥ 5 blocks. The process grid is 2 ⇥ 3. Suppose npi,j , npi,j are the size
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Figure 4.4: Local checkpointing algorithm
of data owned by process (i, j) (yellow and green for process (0,1) and (1,1)). Each
process has a local vertical checksum space in memory of size 2 ⇥ nqi,j .
Suppose LU factorization proceeds until the second column resulting in the left
factor in the area covered in red trapezoid. Right after the panel factorization, all
processes that have blocks in the current matrix column started to check if they own
any blocks belonging to the current left factor. In this example, process (0,0) has 2
blocks in the red rectangle, and (0,1) has one and half blocks in the red trapezoid.
Both of these two processes start to apply their local generator matrix of size 2 ⇥
nqi,j for the 2 blocks using DGEMM, and for process (0,1) the first DGEMM is
carried out in DTRMM because only the strict lower triangular part is needed. The
result is written in the corresponding local checksum location depicted in red lines in
Figure 4.4.
To recover from an error, the same checkpointing scheme as in section 4.4.1 is
used locally by each process. Every column of the involved processes is checked for
erroneous data and therefore the local checkpointing makes the left-factor protection
capable of recovering from one soft error per column of each process.
The advantage of this checkpointing is that it removes unnecessary global
communication during checkpointing and breaks the checkpointing operation into
dP e embarrassingly parallelism. Further more, on a cluster where more than one
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core is available on each computing node, this checkpointing can be further hidden
by executing it in a separate thread so that the main thread can move on quickly to
later steps. The scalability of the local checkpointing is evaluated in Section 4.8.2.

4.4.3

Error Encoding for L: Multiple Errors Per Column

In this section, the encoding scheme in Section 4.4.1 is further extended to mitigate
multiple errors per column in L, implemented with the local checkpointing technique
in Section 4.4.2.
For any column of the factorized panel [l1 , l2 , · · · , lk ]T in L, the objective of
checkpointing is to allow recovery from soft errors that occur to a certain number
of data items in a column.
For any column of the factorized panel in L, [l1 , l2 , · · · , lk ]T , the following three
checksums c1 to c3 are produced:
8
>
>
>
<

l 1 + l 2 + · · · + l k = c1

w 1 l 1 + w 2 l 2 + · · · + w k l k = c2
>
>
>
:u l + u l + ··· + u l = c
1 1

2 2

k k

(4.5)

3

Since all computation are carried out in floating point number with a fixed number
of digits for exponent and fraction, the selection of wi and ui should avoid causing
large contrast between operands during computing that encourages the accumulation
of round-o↵ errors. As an opposite example, in [61], the use of Vandermonde matrix
where wi = j and ui = j 2 incur fast increase of checkpointing weight magnitude and
causes notable precision loss from round-o↵ errors. When this method is used with
large matrices, the resulted error locations are ambiguously in between integers.
To work with round-o↵ errors, we propose to choose wi and ui from random
numbers between 0 and 1. Suppose soft errors change li and lj to lˆi and lˆj respectively,
i < j. During the error detection step (step 3.2) in Algorithm 2, re-generating the
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checksum gives:
8
>
>
>
<

l1 + · · · + lˆi + · · · + lˆj + · · · + lk = cˆ1

w1 l1 + · · · + wi lˆi + · · · + wj lˆj + · · · + wk lk = cˆ2
>
>
>
: u l + · · · + u lˆ + · · · + u lˆ + · · · + u l = cˆ
1 1

i i

j j

k k

(4.6)

3

Subtract (4.6) from (4.5), we have
8
>
>
>
<

c1 = lˆi

cˆ1

cˆ2
>
>
>
: cˆ

3

li + lˆj

lj

c2 = wi (lˆi

li ) + wj (lˆj

lj )

c3 = ui (lˆi

li ) + uj (lˆj

lj )

(4.7)

This system of equations is defined as the “symptom equations”. The symptom
equations establish the relationship between soft errors and checksum, however it
cannot be solved “as is” since the six unknowns lˆi , lˆj , wi , wj and ui , uj outnumber
the available three equations.
To reduce the number of knowns, let ui = wi2 , i = 1, · · · , k. Combine the first
and second equation in (4.7), we have:
lˆj

lj =

1
wj

wi

((cˆ2

c2 )

wi (cˆ1

c1 ))

(4.8)

And similarly combine the first and third equation:
lˆj
Eliminate lˆj

lj =

(cˆ3

c3 ) wi2 (cˆ1
wj2 wi2

c1 )

(4.9)

lj from (4.8) and (4.9) by connecting the right hand sides, (4.7) can

be eventually reduced to
(cˆ3

c3 )

(wi + wj )(cˆ2

c2 ) + wi wj (cˆ1
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c1 ) = 0

(4.10)

This equation is, in this work, defined as the “check equation”. wi , wj can be
determined by iterating through all possibilities in w with O(n2 ) complexity because
i < j, and for each i, n

i pairs of wi wj are tested in (4.10).

This checkpointing method also applies to one-error recovery. Suppose an error
occurs to li only, and (4.7) becomes
8
>
>
c˜ c1 = l˜i li
>
< 1
c˜2 c2 = wi (l˜i li )
>
>
>
: c˜ c = u (l˜ l )
3
3
i i
i

(4.11)

The same method in 4.4.1 can be used to determine li from the first two equations of
(4.11).
Using (4.7), the error detection and recovery algorithm is summarized in
Algorithm 3. Note that this error protection for L applies for each column of L.
Algorithm 3 Error detection and recovery in L
Require: Ã, error column l and generator row w of length N , wi , wj 2 w and
wi 6= wj , i, j 2 {1 · · · N }
Calculate cˇi = cˆi ci , i = 1, 2, 3
if cˇi == 0, i = 1, 2, 3 then
No error
else if cˇ2 /cˇ1 == cˇ3 /cˇ2 == wi then
One error in row i, column l of the output matrix
Recover by solving cˆ1 c1 = lˆi li
else
At least two errors in column l of the output matrix
Iterate all possible pairs wi , wj 2 w
if (cˆ3 c3 ) (wi + wj )(cˆ2 c2 ) + wi wj (cˆ1 c1 ) = 0 then
Two errors are in rows i and j, column l of the output matrix
Recover by solving the overdetermined least square equations in (4.7) with wi
and wj as known constants and x = lˆi li and y = lˆj lj as unknowns
else
More than two errors occurs
end if
end if
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The error detection and recovery algorithm can be extended to t errors with
complexity O(nt ) to determine the locations of errors. For example, when t = 3,
symptom equation 4.7 becomes
8
>
>
>
>
>
>
<

cˆ1

c1 = lˆi

li + lˆj

lj + lˆk

lk

cˆ2

c2 = wi (lˆi

li ) + wj (lˆj

lj ) + wk (lˆk

lk )

>
>
cˆ3
>
>
>
>
: cˆ
4

c3 = ui (lˆi

li ) + uj (lˆj

lj ) + uk (lˆk

lk )

c4 = hi (lˆi

li ) + hj (lˆj

lj ) + hk (lˆk

lk )

(4.12)

Here i, j and k correspond to the three errors’ locations. Similar to the double-error
case, we use ui = wi2 and hi = wi3 , i = 1 · · · k. The symptom equations in (4.12) is
simplified to:
8
>
>
>
>
>
>
<

where Ci = cˆi

C1 = x + y + z
C2 = w i x + w j y + w k z

>
>
C3 = wi2 x + wj2 y + wk2 z
>
>
>
>
:C = w 3 x + w 3 y + w 3 z
4
i
j
k

ci , i = 1 · · · 4, and x = lˆi

li , y = lˆj

(4.13)

lj , and z = lˆk

lk . The task

is to determine wi , wj and wk .
Represent x and y as functions of z using the first two equations from (4.13):
8
<x =

:y =

w j C1 C2
wj
w i C1 C2
wi

(wj wk )z
wi
(wi wk )z
wj

(4.14)

Replace x and y in the 3rd and 4th equations of (4.13) with (4.14) and reduce z,
the check equation is formed as:
C4 (wi
(wi

wj ) + wi3 (wj C1 C2 ) wj3 (wi C1 C2 )
wj )wk3 (wi wk )wj3 + (wj wk )wi3

C3 (wi
=
(wi

wj ) + wi2 (wj C1 C2 ) wj2 (wi C1 C2 )
wj )wk2 (wi wk )wj2 + (wj wk )wi2
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(4.15)

By iterating through all possible pairs of wi , wj and wk using the check equation, the
three error locations can be determined and the error value can be found accordingly.

4.5

Encoding for Multiple Errors in Ū and Ũ

Soft errors in Ū and Ũ di↵er from those in L because they participate in the
computation and therefore propagate to large areas. The case with two errors are
discussed in detail and is then shown how to extend to t > 2 errors. For soft errors
in matrix operation, Luk et al. has proposed to cast soft error to an initial erroneous
matrix to avoid considering the difficulty of detecting error timely [89]. Fitzpatrick,
et al. extended Luk’s modeling to two soft errors [61]. In their works, a soft error
is treated as a rank-one perturbation to the matrix. The e↵ect of the soft error is
cast back to a di↵erent initial matrix from which “conceptually” the LU factorization
produces the same erroneous result but without the soft error occurring during the
process. Based on this model and using a di↵erent encoding scheme (similar to the
one in Section 4.4.3), this section devise methods to detect and correct multiple soft
errors for LU with partial pivoting. The encoding scheme makes the soft error model
suitable for floating point number operations.

4.5.1

Soft Errors Modeling

LU factorization can be viewed as multiplying a set of triangularization matrices
from the left on the input matrix A to get the final triangular form. Let A0 = A, and
At = Lt 1 Pt 1 At 1 . Pt

1

is the partial pivoting matrix at step t

1. At the end of

the factorization, P A0 = LU , where U is an upper triangular matrix.
Suppose two soft errors occur in the Ū or Ũ area at locations (i1 , j1 ) and (i2 , j2 )
in step s1 and s2 . In the most general case, s1 6= s2 , i1 6= i2 and j1 6= j2 . Without
loss of generality, let s1 < s2 .
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At step s2 , express the soft error as a perturbation to the matrix at location
(i2 , j2 ):
ei2 eTj2

Âs2 = As2

As2 is the state of the matrix at step s2 right before the soft error occurs, and Âs2 is
outcome of As2 modified by a soft error of magnitude

at location (i2 , j2 ). ei2 and

ej2 are zero column vectors with 1s at rows i2 and j2 respectively.
The error at step s2 is cast back as a perturbation to the matrix at step s1 ,
ei2 eTj2

Âs2 = As2

= L s 2 1 Ps 2 1 L s 2 2 Ps 2
)

(Ls2 1 Ps2 1 Ls2 2 Ps2
= Âs1

ei2 eTj2

· · · Ls1 Ps1 Âs1

2

2

· · · Ls1 Ps1 ) 1 Âs2

(Ls2 1 Ps2 1 Ls2 2 Ps2

2

· · · L s 1 Ps 1 )

1

ei2 eTi2

Let
f = (Ls2 1 Ps2 1 Ls2 2 Ps2
(Ls2 1 Ps2 1 Ls2 2 Ps2

2

2

· · · L s 1 Ps 1 )

1

e i2 ,

· · · Ls1 Ps1 ) 1 Âs2 = Âs¯2

Therefore,
f eTj2

Âs¯2 = Âs1

(4.16)

Continue casting (4.16) to the soft error at step s1 :
Âs¯2 = Âs1
= As1

ei1 eTj1

f eTj2
f eTj2

= L s 1 1 Ps 1 1 L s 1 2 P s 1

2

· · · L 0 P 0 A0
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ei1 eTj1

f eTj2

Let
d = (Ls1 1 Ps1 1 Ls1 2 Ps1
(Ls1 1 Ps1 1 Ls1 2 Ps1

2

2

· · · L0 P0 )

1

e i1 ,

· · · L0 P0 ) 1 Âs¯2 = Âs¯1

And notice that
(Ls1 1 Ps1 1 Ls1 2 Ps1

2

(Ls2 1 Ps2 1 Ls2 2 Ps2

· · · L 0 P0 )
2

= (Ls2 1 Ps2 1 Ls2 2 Ps2

1

⇥

· · · L s 2 Ps 2 )

1

· · · L 0 P0 )

1

2

Let
g = (Ls1 1 Ps1 1 Ls1 2 Ps1

2

= (Ls2 1 Ps2 1 Ls2 2 Ps2

· · · L 0 P0 )

2

· · · L 0 P0 )

1
1

⇥f
ei 2

And we have
Âs¯1 = A0

deTj1

geTj2

Through this modeling process, the two soft errors are cast back to the input
matrix A0 as perturbation to the columns of j1 and j2 . For more than 2 errors, the
same process can be repeated and the general model for t errors is

Â0 = A0

t
X

dji eTji

j=1

4.5.2

Errors Detection

The soft error model can be used to determined the errors’ locations, as will be shown
in this section. While this model is for the case where soft errors occur only in matrix
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A, in fact checksum and the right hand sides b of Ax = b are equally susceptible to
soft errors. For these errors, b can be protected by duplication and cross check, and
the protection method for L in section 4.4 can be directly applied to protect right
hand sides.
In [61], four columns of checksum are used to locate two soft errors. Instead,
we show that for N errors, N + 1 columns are enough for error detection and data
recovery.
For the input matrix A 2 R

N ⇥N

, checksum is generated before the factorization

using generator matrix
2

T

3

2

e
1 ···
6
7 6
6 T 7 6
G = 6 w 7 = 6 w1 · · ·
4
5 4
2 T
(w )
w12 · · ·

1

3

7
7
wN 7
5
2
wN

(4.17)

and A is encoded as
[A, A ⇥ GT ] = [A, Ae, Aw, Aw2 ]
Note that the square operation is elementwise.
LU factorization is applied with the three additional checksum columns on the
right as
P [A, Ae, Aw, Aw2 ] = L[U, c, v, s]
c, v, s 2 R

N ⇥1

(4.18)

are the checksum after factorization.

As shown in the error model, the LU factorization infected with errors is equal to
an error-free LU factorization to a di↵erent initial (erroneous) matrix Â0 . Using A
to represent the original correct initial matrix and Â for the erroneous initial matrix,
(4.18) becomes:
P̂ [Â, Ae, Aw, Aw2 ] = L̂[Û , ĉ, v̂, ŝ]
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And using relationship between ĉ and Ae:
ĉ = L̂ 1 P̂ Ae = L̂ 1 P̂ (Â + deTj1 + geTj2 )e
= L̂ 1 (L̂Û + P̂ deTj1 + P̂ geTj2 )e
= Û e + L̂ 1 P̂ d + L̂ 1 P̂ g
Therefore
ĉ

Û e = L̂ 1 P̂ d + L̂ 1 P̂ g

By the same token,
v̂
ŝ
Let x = L̂ 1 P̂ d 2 R

N ⇥1

Û w = wj1 L̂ 1 P̂ d + wj2 L̂ 1 P̂ g
Û w2 = wj21 L̂ 1 P̂ d + wj22 L̂ 1 P̂ g

, and y = L̂ 1 P̂ g 2 R
8
>
>
>
<

v̂
>
>
>
:ŝ

ĉ

N ⇥1

, we have

Û e = x + y

Û w = wj1 x + wj2 y
Û w2 = wj21 x + wj22 y

This system of equations is the vector form of (4.7), and similarly can be reduced
to the check equation:
(ŝ

Û w2 )

(wj1 + wj2 )(v̂

Û w) +

wj1 wj2 (ĉ

Û e) = 0

(4.19)

wj1 and wj2 can be determined by iterating through all possible N ⇥ (N

1)

combinations in w for a pair that makes (4.19) hold. As a result, the error columns
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j1 and j2 are determined. Later, these error columns are used to recover the solution
of Ax = b.
For t soft errors, with the error model in (4.17), the check equation is:
8
>
>
c0
>
>
>
>
< c
1
>
>
>
>
>
>
:c
t 1

Û w0

=

Û w1

=
..
.

Û wt

1

wj01 x1 + · · · + wj0t xt
wj11 x1 + · · · + wj1t xt

(4.20)

= wjt1 1 x1 + · · · + wjtt 1 xt

All powers in (4.20) are elementwise. This general case of check equation in vector
form for t errors exhibits the same structure as in the scalar form. For t = 3 it
has been shown that check equation (4.15) can be used to determine error locations
except the scalar residues Ci is replaced with vector residues ci

Û wi .

For two errors, the complexity of locating wj1 and wj2 is O(N 3 ) because for each
pair of wj1 and wj2 a vector norm is calculated to test for zero vector in (4.19) which
takes O(N ) operations. For t > 2, the complexity of determining the error columns
exceeds the complexity of LU factorization itself, making this method computationally
impractical for real use. The same problem exists for L protection too when t > 3.
The next section provides solution to this issue.
Since errors in Ū and Ũ propagate, the solution to (4.20) alone is insufficient
for recovering the right factor U as only the columns of the initial errors can be
determined. However for system of linear equations, by using Sherman-MorrisonWoodbury formula, the solution can be recovered.

4.6

Complexity Reduction

As the number of tolerable errors t increases, the complexity of locating the initial
error columns grows exponentially. To resolve this issue and provide multiple error

82

resilience capability with practical overhead, this section proposes the complexity
reduction methods for L and U .

4.6.1

Reduction for L

As shown in (4.15), to tolerate three errors in a column of L of length N , O(N 3 )
operations are required. Even though the search can be embarrassingly parallelized
since each search path is independent of others, the overall complexity is still high
when large t is desired.
In the complexity O(N t+1 ), N is the factor that determines the range of search. By
breaking the search range into smaller segments, thereby reducing N , the complexity
can be decreased to an a↵ordable level.
There exist many ways of segmenting N but since each segment requires storage
space for checksum, the segmenting method should minimize the overall storage
requirement. Use Nk to represent the segment size. The kth root of the vector length
is chosen in this work as the segment size where k is integer and , k

1.

1

Split N into equally sized segments of length Nk = N k . Apply the encoding
1
k

method in (4.5) to each of the N 1

segments. For each vector to tolerate t errors,

t + 1 checksum items are required. Therefore for a vector of length N , the total
amount of space required to store checksums is
N1

1
k

⇥ (t + 1) ⇥ N

And the storage overhead over that for the data vector has the trend
lim (N 1

N !1

1
k

⇥ (t + 1) ⇥ N ⇥

1
t+1
) = lim p
=0
2
N !1 k N
N

Based on the kth root segmenting method, the error detection and recovery are
performed following Algorithm 4 (Using t = 2 as an example). Since the expensive
error locating procedure is now carried out within a smaller range, the complexity
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Figure 4.5: Storage overhead (t = 3)
of error detection is largely reduced. The operation count for Algorithm 4 includes
p
p
1
N 1 K vector norms of length k N , and iterating in k N for the correct pair of wi and
wj . The total overhead of locating t errors in one segment is
1

O(N k ⇥ N 1

1
k

1

) + O((N k )t )
8
>
<O(N )
t
= O(N ) + O(N k ) =
>
:O(N kt )

if t  k
if t > k

Algorithm 4 Error detection and recovery for one column l of L
p
Require: Vector l of length N ; Segment length nb = k N .
1
for i = 1 ! N 1 k do
Using notation in (4.5),
In the ith segment with elements l1 , · · · , lnb
if k(l1 + l2 + · · · + lnb ) c1 k > 0 then
Locate errors using (4.10)
Fix errors by solving the symptom equations in (4.7)
end if
end for
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Figure 4.6: Error locating time (t = 3)
Note that the number of tolerable soft error t is for each segment. Therefore for large
total number of tolerable errors per vector, each segment can select a smaller t, hence
demanding less error locating overhead. For a fixed t, increasing k has the same e↵ect
by reducing the range of search, but comes at the cost of more extra storage according
to (4.21). To evaluate the e↵ect that di↵erent k plays on storage overhead and error
locating time, an simulation is performed for t = 3 in MATLAB. Figure 4.5 and 4.6
show the result. In the vector case, t = 3 is the smallest “forbidden case” since the
complexity to locate errors is O(N 3 ), already the same as that of LU factorization. In
this simulation, three errors are injected to the farthest end of input vectors, making
it the worst case for error locating since all combinations of wi , wj and wk have to be
tried against (4.15) before a match can be found.
Compare the storage overhead and error locating time, when k = 3, checksum
uses the most (nearly 40%) extra storage while finds error in less than 0.001 seconds,
while k = 2 only requires slightly over 10% extra storage but still achieves over 104
speed up to locate errors at large sizes. When k > 3 the storage overhead becomes
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una↵ordable with little improvement in error locating speed. Therefore k = 2 is a
fair choice compromising both storage overhead and error locating speed, and the
3

complexity when t = 3 and k = 2 is O(N 2 ) < O(N 3 ).

4.6.2

Reduction for U

For Ū and Ũ , without any complexity management, locating t soft errors requires
O(N t+1 ) operations, one order higher than the original complexity for L protection.
To reduce the complexity to an a↵ordable level, the segmenting method in section
4.6.1 is extended to apply on blocked LU algorithm for Ū and Ũ protection.
Block Encoding of Matrix
In blocked LU algorithm, panel factorization itself is an LU factorization of a tall and
skinny panel, therefore the encoding technique in 4.5 can be used to protect a panel
or several panels too if the encoding is performed accordingly.
Theorem 4.6.1. Block Encoding protects the trailing matrix at the end of each
iteration of LU factorization
Proof. Given a matrix A of size N ⇥ N and generator matrix G. Split A into equally
sized block Nk ⇥ Nk and let G have size Nk ⇥ (t + 1), where t is the number of errors
tolerable by using G. Matrix A is encoded as:
2

A11
6
6
6 A21
6
6 ..
6 .
4
An1

A12

···

A1n

A11 G

···

A22
..
.

···
..
.

A2n
..
.

A21 G
..
.

···
..
.

An2

···

Ann

An1 G

···

A1n G

3

7
7
A2n G 7
7
7
..
7
.
5
Ann G

Start by performing one iteration of LU factorization for the first panel of block of
size N ⇥ Nk , generating U11 and Li,1 where 2 < i < n. Then perform triangular
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solving and trailing matrix update making the encoded matrix into state:
2
6
6
6
6
6
6
4

L11 \U11

U12

···

U1n

C11

···

C1n

L21
..
.

Ã22
..
.

···
..
.

Ã2n
..
.

C21
..
.

···
..
.

C2n
..
.

Ln1

Ãn2

···

Ãnn

Cn1

···

Cnn

3
7
7
7
7
7
7
5

(4.21)

Note that similar to ScaLAPACK storage format, the lower triangular blocks Li,1 , 2 <
i < n are stored in the zeroed out area in the first panel.
According to (4.1), we have
8
>
>
>
>
>
>
<

U1j = L111 A1j
C1j = L111 A1j G

>
>
>
>
>
>
:

Ãij = Aij

Li1 ⇥ U1j

Cij = Cij

Li1 ⇥ C1j

) C̃ij = Aij G
= (Aij

i = {2, · · · , n}
j = {1, · · · , n}

Li1 L111 Aij G

Li1 U1j )G = Ãij G

Similar method can be used in the rest of the iterations.
As an example, take a matrix A of 2 ⇥ 2 blocks encoded using the generator in
(4.17):
2

Ac = 4

A11 A12 A11 G A12 G
A21 A22 A21 G A22 G

3
5

Carry out LU factorization to Ac and we have:
2

Ac = 4

L11

0

L21 L22

32
54

U11 U12 C11 C12
0
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U22 C21 C22

3
5

And C1 to C4 can be calculated as:
8
<C
:C

11

= U11 G, C12 = U12 G

21

= ?, C22

(4.22)

= U22 G

This shows that after LU factorization, the added four checksum blocks o↵er
protection to the three data blocks U11 , U12 and U22 independently. Since G in (4.17)
o↵ers t errors protection capability, the three data blocks in U each can tolerate up
to t soft errors.
In ScaLAPACK, matrix A is split into blocks of size N B ⇥ N B, therefore when
p
k = 2, the encoding block size Nk is N ⇥ N rounded to multiple of N B.
p
p
Error detection is performed on each
N ⇥ N blocks. For U11 , first
kU11 ⇥ G(:, 1)

C11 (:, 1)k is checked and if the norm is sufficiently large, the error
p
p
detection procedure in 4.5.2 is then activated for this N ⇥ N block.
The complexity of performing blocked error detection and locating includes the
error check that is either full or upper triangular matrix-vector multiplication and the
1

error locating operation within the block. Suppose Nk = N k rounded to a multiple
of N B, and the generator matrix G has size Nk ⇥ t for t error resilience capability.
Since error checking is only carried out in the upper triangular blocks of A, there are
in total 1 + 2 + · · · + N 1

1
k

number of blocks. Therefore the error checking complexity

is
(1 + 2 + · · · + N 1
=

N1

1
k

(N 1
2

1
k
1
k

1

) ⇥ O((N k )2 )

+ 1)

t

2

⇥ O(N k )
1

And the error locating complexity is O(N k ⇥ N k ). For instance, when k = 2 and
t = 2, the total overhead of error detection and locating is
p

p
3
N ( N + 1)
⇥ O(N ) + O(N 2 ) = O(N 2 ) < O(N 3 )
2
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Therefore the overhead is a↵ordable for LU factorization.
The total amount of extra storage for storing checksum columns is
N ⇥ N1

1
k

⇥ (t + 1)

And the storage overhead over that for the data vector has the trend
lim (N ⇥ N 1

N !1

1
k

⇥ (t + 1) ⇥

1
t+1
) = lim p
=0
k
2
N
!1
N
N

Similar to the scalar case in 4.6.1, compromise has to be made between t and
k for number of error tolerated and storage overhead for checksum. Following the
evaluation in Figure 4.6 and 4.5, t = k = 2 is chosen for the experiments in this work.
Reduction of ABFT Extra Flops
The additional ABFT checksum columns to protect U participate in the trailing
matrix update (L22 U22 = A22

L21 U12 in (4.1)) of LU factorization, and since trailing

matrix update takes up a majority of the floating point operations (FLOPS) of LU,
extra FLOPS from the additional checksum columns could cause significant overhead
even if no errors occur at all. Block encoding in section 4.6.2 helps reduce the error
locating overhead, but in fact it also o↵ers an insight to lower the error-free overhead.
In (4.22), encoding is performed within blocks [A11 , A21 ]T and [A12 , A22 ]T
separately. For block A11 , the checksum C11 ’s relationship with U11 by C11 = U11 ⇥ G
is established when panel [A11 , A21 ]T is factorized. After this point, C11 are not
subject to any further change and C21 remains zero even though further operations
(triangular solve with C21 as right hand sides) are applied. The invariance of C11 and
C21 after the first panel factorization indicates that [C11 , C21 ]T can be excluded from
any later operations.
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matrix'

checksum'

Figure 4.7: Checksum layout example of a 5 ⇥ 5 blocks matrix
Corollary 4.6.2. After each step of LU factorization, one panel of checksum columns
corresponding to the panel being factorized in this step can be excluded from further
operation.
Proof. In (4.21), U12 does not participate in any further operation because the next
iteration starts from Ã22 to the bottom-right corner of the encoded matrix.
*

Li1 = Ai1 ⇥ U111 , i = [2, · · · , n]

)

Ci1 = Ai1 G

Li1 C11 = Ai1 G

= Li1 U11 G

Li1 U11 G = Ø

Li1 U11 G

Since C21 is used as the right hand sides of the triangular solve in the next iteration,
which produces Ø as result too, after the trailing matrix update of the next iteration,
C21 , · · · , Cn1 are all still Ø. Therefore the panel [C11 , · · · , Cn1 ] are not subject to
further change nor does it contribute to any factorization result, hence this panel can
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be excluded. In the next iteration, the actively participating data is
2
6
6
6
6
6
6
4

L11 \U11

U12

···

U1n

C12

···

C1n

L21
..
.

Ã22
..
.

···
..
.

Ã2n
..
.

C22
..
.

···
..
.

C2n
..
.

Ln1

Ãn2

···

Ãnn

Cn2

···

Cnn

3
7
7
7
7
7
7
5

By the same process, in each iteration the panel of checksum columns that corresponds
to the just factorized matrix can be left out of further operation.
In order to benefit from the complexity reduction of Corollary 4.6.2, the layout
of checksum columns is reversed horizontally. Figure 4.7 shows an example of such
design. The block size is the Nk . Each Nk ⇥ Nk block has a Nk ⇥ t block of checksum.
The checksum blocks are labelled with the same color as the data they serve, for
example the green blocks on the right end protects the green data blocks on the left
end. This layout makes it easy to implement the complexity reduction in ScaLAPACK
PDGESV by simply reducing the scope of PDTRSM and PDGEMM. When panel
factorization finishes the green data blocks, the green checksum blocks are no longer
touched in coming iterations and therefore the extra FLOPS of updating the green
blocks are eliminated. The same process continues with each checksum panels till the
end of the factorization.

4.7

Recovery Algorithm

After soft errors are detected and located by their columns, the correct solution to
the system of equations Ax = b can be recovered.

[61] suggested using Sherman-

Morrison-Woodbury formula for the case of two soft errors. In this section we first
review the recovery procedure and then analyze the computational complexity for
correcting t soft errors.
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4.7.1

Correction for x

As shown in Algorithm 2, factorization result L̂ and Û are used to compute the
solution x̂ even if the factorization has been subject to soft errors. The solution x is
corrected later from x̂ when errors are detected.
From Ax = b, we have
x = A 1 b = A 1 (P̂

1

P̂ )b

= (P̂ A) 1 P̂ b
1

Both P̂ and b are known, so (P̂ A)

is needed for x.

From (4.17), the erroneous initial matrix Âs¯1 di↵ers from the real initial matrix
A0 by column j1 and j2 , therefore
P̂ Â = (P̂ a·j1

L̂Û·j1 )eTj1 + (P̂ a·j2

L̂Û·j2 )eTj2

) P̂ A = L̂Û + (P̂ a·j1

L̂Û·j1 )eTj1 + (P̂ a·j2

L̂Û·j2 )eTj2

P̂ A

= L̂Û + L̂(L̂ 1 P̂ a·j1
Let tj1 = L̂ 1 P̂ a·j1

Û·j1 )eTj1 + L̂(L̂ 1 P̂ a·j2

Û·j1 , and tj2 = L̂ 1 P̂ a·j2
) P̂ A = L̂Û (I + Û

Let vj1 = Û

h

1

tj1 and vj2 = Û

i

1

1

Û·j2 )eTj2

Û·j2 ,

tj1 eTj1 + Û

1

tj2 eTj2 )

t j2 ,

) P̂ A = L̂Û (I + vj1 eTj1 + vj2 eTj2 )
h
ih
iT
= L̂Û (I + vj1 vj2 ej1 ej2 )
h

i

Let Ux = vj1 vj2 , Vx = ej1 ej2 ),
) (P̂ A)

1

= (I + Ux VxT ) 1 (L̂Û )
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1

(4.23)

Apply the Sherman-Morrison-Woodbury formula [140, 141] to (4.23):
x = (P̂ A) 1 P̂ b
= (I

Ux (I + Vx Ux 1 VxT )(L̂Û ) 1 P̂ b

= (I

Ux (I + VxT Ux ) 1 VxT )x̂

(4.24)

Hence the correct solution x can be corrected from x̂.

4.7.2

Computation Complexity

At the center of computing the correct solution is
Ux (I + VxT Ux ) 1 VxT
For t errors, VxT Ux produces a t ⇥ t matrix. t is normally selected as small integers
such as 2 or 3 for the protection from flips in 2⇥ or 3⇥ 64 bits, hence the inverse of
t ⇥ t can be solved directly. For example, when t = 2
2
4

a b
c d

3
5

1

=

1
ad

bc

2
4

d
c

b
a

3
5

resulting in eight FLOPS. And since Vx is filled with 0s except the two 1s at row j1
and j2 of column one and two respectively, four FLOPS are needed to generate VxT Ux
and I plus the result of VxT Ux , each. Let Y = (I + VxT Ux ) 1 , similarly due to the
sparsity of Vx , Y ⇥ VxT also requires four FLOPS. Let Z = Y ⇥ VxT , compute Z ⇥ x̂
yields a 2 ⇥ 1 matrix costing six FLOPS, and at last 4 ⇥ N FLOPS are paid to update
the solution on x̂. In summary, O(N ) overhead is required to calculate (4.24).
Another part of operation overhead comes from computing Ux , namely vj1 · · · vjt .

Each of these vectors takes O(N 2 ) to compute by PDTRSM with Û , and also O(N 2 )
to generate the t right hand side vectors from tjk = L̂ 1 P̂ a·jk
93

Û·jk , k 2 [1 · · · t] for

PDTRSM. Therefore, to tolerate up to t soft errors, with t being a constant, O(N 2 )
is the computation complexity for the recovery of x from x̂.

4.8

Performance Evaluation

This section evaluates the performance of our algorithm in scalability, checkpointing
overhead and performance. The scalability and overhead tests are carried out on
a small cluster at the University of Tennessee, Knoxville (UTK) named “Dancer”,
which is an 8-node based on two quad Intel 2.27GHz Xeon cores per node, with
an Infiniband 20G interconnect. For the performance experiment, we use another
cluster at UTK called ”Newton”, which has 72 Dell C6100 computing nodes connected
by QDR Infiniband for MPI application. Each node has two 6-core Intel Xeon
CPUs. We use OpenMPI on both clusters, and our algorithm implementation is
based on ScaLAPACK 1.8.0 from the Netlib using double precision, and on each
node GotoBLAS2-1.13 is used. Last, the experiments are run on a Cray XT5 named
“Kraken” in large scale. In all the experiments, block size N B for ScaLAPACK is set
to 100. The column of original matrix that is required for recovery is re-generated by
PDMATGEN of ScaLAPACK. We first evaluate the case of one soft error occurs in
the left and right factor, then this is extended to the multiple-error case.

4.8.1

Performance Model for the Right Factor

For the right factor, t + 1 columns of checksum are appended at the beginning of
the factorization to protect against t errors, therefore the overhead consists of this
one-time checkpointing and extra FLOPS of carrying out LU factorization with the
checksum.
According to [15], the execution time of LU driver (PDGESV) in ScaLAPACK is
T (N, P ) = Cf

N3
N2
N
tf + Cv p tv + Cm
tm
P
NB
P
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(4.25)

Here N and N B are matrix size and block size (supposed square matrix with square
blocks), and P is the total number of processes. Cf =

2
,
3

Cv = 3 +

1
4

log2 P and

Cm = N B(6 + log2 P ). Because in our implementation, checksum resides in-site with
computing processes, all three constants remain unchanged in (4.25).
When t = 1, the two extra columns of checksum cause
Textra = Cf

6N 2 + 12N + 8
4N + 4
1
tf + Cv p
tv + Cm
tm
P
NB
P

extra run time, which is O(N 2 ) and is negligible to T (N, P ) when problem size and
machine size scale up. In fact, this result also applies to the case of multiple errors.
Since the number of checksum columns is a function of the number of tolerable errors
t, which is independent of N , Textra is still O(N 2 ).
The initial checkpointing for the right factor is dominated by a matrix-matrix
operation with matrices of size N ⇥ N and N ⇥ (t + 1) for t errors in Ũ and Ū . Using
a similar model in (4.25), this overhead is also O(N 2 ).

4.8.2

Scalability

Since checkpointing is performed in each iteration for the left factor, the scalability
of this algorithm is the main concern. The operation counts of checkpointing a panel
of height Ni using PDGEMM is 2 ⇥ N B ⇥ Ni .
Figure 4.8 is the overhead experiment under weak scaling on the Dancer cluster.
The overhead is calculated by
Tf t pdgesv Tnetlib pdgesv
⇥ 100%
Tnetlib pdgesv
And Tf t pdgesv is the run time of the soft resilient version of PDGESV, whereas
Tnetlib pdgesv is the run time of the Netlib PDGESV, which is what the fault tolerance
version is built upon, and serves as a performed baseline.
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Figure 4.8: Weak scalability of global and local checkpointing for the left factor on
the Dancer cluster
The result shows that the overhead of vertical checkpointing increases as
computing scale and problem size scales up.

Since vertical checkpointing is

implemented by PDGEMM with M = 2, K = Ni and N = N B, the checkpointing
performance is limited by the performance of PDGEMM. Figure 4.9 is PDGEMM
performance under such shape comparing to the M = N = K case. The colors of
lines are coordinated with the color of vertical axis titles. Clearly PDGEMM does
not scale in this matrix shape. In fact, PDGEMM in PBLAS (part of ScaLAPACK)
is implemented based on the DIMMA [36] algorithm, which is an enhanced version
of SUMMA [136]. SUMMA is designed to work with outer product shape for high
parallelism along with sophisticated broadcasting scheme, therefore the inner product
shape used by the vertical checkpointing cannot benefit from such a design. In
contrast, the local checkpointing scales well because checkpointing is performed in
parallel by all involved processes and global collective operation is avoided. This
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Figure 4.9: Weak scalability test of PDGEMM on the Dancer cluster
scalability ensures that the overhead caused by the left factor checkpointing will not
grow into a performance drag when moving to a larger scale.
With the local checkpointing, the overall overhead of the fault tolerant PDGESV
is shown in Figure 4.10, where 64 processes are arranged in a 8 ⇥ 8 grid. For the case
marked with “one error in L and U”, two data items are modified as error injection
at location (400,150) and (300,500) right before the panel factorization for blocks
(501:end,501:600) starts. The “one error” case includes the checkpointing overhead
and the time to recover from the two errors. Same setup applied to performance
experiments with alike marks.
This experiment shows that the overhead decreases with larger problems. At
32000, the overhead of the initial checkpointing for the right factor, local checkpointing for the left factor and the extra FLOPS from doing PDGESV with two extra
columns is below 1%.
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Figure 4.10: The checkpointing and recovery overhead on the Dancer cluster

4.8.3

Recovery Performance

To test the recovery performance, experiments are carried out on the Dancer, Newton
and Kraken clusters.
Single Error
Figure 4.11 is the performance in Gflop/s of the same experiment in Figure 4.10.
PDGEMM performance is included as the achievable machine peak to show that
ScaLAPACK PDGESV runs at a reasonable speed. Figure 4.12 is the result on
Newton with 256 processes in a 16 ⇥ 16 grid. Both Gflop/s performance results show
that the soft error resilience functionality demands little overhead, and moving to a
larger grid does not cause overhead increase.
For LU, algorithm stability is an important issue and it is critical that the
recovered solution is numerically close to the original solution. Since in all our
experiments the recovered residue r =

kAx bk
kAkkbkM

is in the same magnitude as that

of the original solution, this comparison is skipped.
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Figure 4.11: PDGESV performance with and without soft error resilience on the
Dancer cluster
Figure 4.13 and 4.14 show experiments on a larger installation: the Kraken
supercomputer. For this two runs, 6144 and 24576 cores were used respectively.
The MPI processes were arranged in 32 ⇥ 32 and 64 ⇥ 64 grid, and each MPI process
resides on a six-core AMD 2.6 GHz Istanbul CPU running 6 threads for local BLAS
operation. Both results on Kraken show negligible overhead of error recovery.
Multiple Errors
Soft errors in the left factor are static and the detection and recovery in this area has
been evaluated in Section 4.8.3 showing the scalability and small performance impact
to the host algorithm. The algorithms for multiple soft errors in the right factor,
on the other hand, have higher complexity and are most e↵ectively a↵ected by the
proposed encoding and complexity reduction method. This section therefore focuses
on the evaluation to this part.
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Figure 4.12: PDGESV performance with and without soft error resilience on the
Newton cluster
The experiments in this section are carried on the Kraken supercomputer.
In the experiments, two soft errors are injected into randomly selected locations
(336, 361) and (347, 359) at the beginning of the randomly selected 2nd and 3rd panel
factorization, respectively. Data values are incremented with random magnitudes to
simulate the results of bit flips in the memory slots that hold these data. The block
p
size for encoding is N .
Figure 4.15 shows the e↵ectiveness of the complexity reduction method for U with
a 16 ⇥ 16 process grid on Kraken, and t = 2. The overhead is calculated by
F LOP Snon F T F LOP SF T
%
F LOP Snon F T
When Nk = N , block encoding for soft errors in U is not in e↵ect. The whole matrix
is encoded with a generator matrix of size N ⇥ 3. In this case the overhead is close
to 100% (the blue line), which means the error detection and recovery combined take
as much time as solving the linear system of equation. This is consistent with the
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Figure 4.13: PDGESV performance with and without soft error resilience on 6144
cores of Cray XT5.
theoretical complexity of O(N t+1 ) = O(N 3 ). The red line, on the other hand, is the
p
result when Nk = N . The overhead drops quickly from a little less than 40% to 2%,
which verifies that block encoding largely reduces the error detection overhead. The
cost of this improvement is the extra space for storing checksum which is roughly 1%
of the input matrix for size 50,000.
Figure 4.16 shows the performance of di↵erent matrix sizes on Kraken using
16,384 cores in a 128 ⇥ 128 grid. As the matrix becomes larger, both the original
ScaLAPACK PDGESV and fault tolerant PDGESV with and without errors exhibit
close performance. At the largest size 1000,000, the non-error case adds roughly 1.1%
overhead, and with error correction the overhead increases to 1.3%.
Figure 4.17 is the weak scalability experiment result where both matrix size and
grid dimension are doubled. Throughout all the testing sizes from 64 to 16,384 cores,
FT-PDGESV declares around 1% overhead for both with and without errors cases.
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Figure 4.14: PDGESV performance with and without soft error resilience on 24576
cores of Cray XT5.
From the result in experiments, it can be confirmed that the complexity of
recovering the solution to Ax = b from double soft errors in the right factor has
been e↵ectively managed by the complexity reduction method, and soft errors can
be precisely detected and located with the presence of round-o↵ error. The fault
tolerance functionalities can recover the solution of the dense linear system with
trivial performance impact.

4.9

Conclusion

Resilience to soft error will become a critical task when computer system paces into
the Petaflops age. This section proposes application-level fault tolerance algorithm
that could tolerate multiple soft errors during the execution of linear system solver on
large scale system. The core algorithm is based on diskless checkpointing where an
efficient local checkpointing scheme is devised, and algorithm based fault tolerance
where the e↵ect of soft error in the right factor is casted to the beginning into
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Figure 4.15: Overhead comparison result on Kraken (16 ⇥ 16 grid)
a di↵erent input matrix. A checksum encoding scheme is proposed to work with
floating point operation, and a complexity reduction method is designed to make the
soft error detection and recovery algorithm practical with low performance overhead.
Experimental results on various clusters, including the Kraken supercomputer confirm
the soft error mitigation capability, scalability, the e↵ectiveness of the complexity
reduction scheme, and the negligible performance overhead. Multiple soft errors
in both the left and right factor can be detected and corrected, and the solution
to system of linear equations Ax = b can be recovered even if soft errors have
caused severe error propagation, leading to large area of errors in the right factor
U . The implementation is based on ScaLAPACK, but can be easily extended to
other platforms, and application users can benefit from such implementation directly
without getting involved into the details of error correction. Further research consist
of hardening the implementation for the case where soft errors strike during the
detection and recovery process, and correcting NaN caused by bit flips.
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Chapter 5
Soft Error Resilience on Hybrid
System with GPGPU
5.1

Introduction

Since the introduction of general-purpose computing on graphics processing units
(GPGPU), GPUs have quickly become the backbone of the modern high performance
computing systems. For instance, China’s Tianhe-1A that ranked number one on
the November 2010 TOP500 list [99] uses 7, 168 NVIDIA Tesla M2050 GPGPUs to
achieve 2.57 Pflop/s in the High-Performance LINPACK (HPL) benchmark. While
GPUs provide extremely high floating-point processing power, when combined with
a conventional multi-core CPU in a hybrid fashion, it has been shown to be capable
of further boosting the performance of scientific applications [4] by executing tasks
with less parallelism on CPUs, concurrently with tasks that have high parallelism on
the GPUs.
As the deployment of the GPGPUs grows rapidly, the issue of fault tolerance
that has been only a↵ecting CPU-based computing systems [65, 117] starts to
emerge on GPU-based platforms. Traditionally, fault tolerance had been ignored
in systems utilizing the GPUs because they were originally developed mainly for
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graphics applications, such as 3D games which favor performance over reliability at
bit-wise accuracy. Therefore, transient errors can be tolerated in a vast majority of
rendering situations. As technology brings the GPUs into the scientific computing
arena, transient errors during computing are no longer acceptable, and, to worsen
the situation, in hybrid systems such errors could propagate between the CPUs and
the GPUs making the hybrid systems even more fragile. Unlike fail-stop failure
which brings down the whole system and halts the application execution, transient
errors occur silently causing a “silent data corruption” due to various sources, mostly
from cosmic radiation [76]. The errors leave no trace in system logs for system
administrators to react at the time of failure. The consequences of the transient
errors include incorrect application results, unpredictable code paths taken as a result
of errors, and propagation of the initial failure which, all together, make the task of
error detection and recovery so much more daunting.
In this chapter, we set out to provide fault tolerance and soft error resilience to
the algorithms featured in the Matrix Algebra on the GPU and Multicore Architect
(MAGMA) project [133]. In Chapter 4, methods to recover solution of linear system
Ax = b is discussed. Since only the solution x is required, no recovery is performed
to the factorization result. However there are cases where the factorization result,
both the left and right factor, are equally important, such as QR factorization. This
chapter proposed the methods to detect and recover soft errors in QR factorization,
and the implementation is based on the hybrid MAGMA code using both CPU and
GPGPU.
The rest of this chapter is organized as the follows: Section 5.2 gives a lists the
related work in the field of soft error protection on the GPGPU platforms. Section 5.3
introduces the target QR algorithm and its implementation in MAGMA. Section 5.4
models soft error in the QR algorithm, and Section 5.5 details the recovery algorithm
including the optimization of primitives for Givens rotations on the GPU. Section 5.6
proposes a multiple-error protection algorithm for the left factor Q through tracing the
MAGMA QR. Section 5.7 shows experimental results that evaluate various aspects of
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our fault tolerant algorithm and, finally, Section 5.8 concludes the work and outlines
possible future directions.

5.2

Related Work

Soft error in the GPU has been exploited [74], and methods have been developed to
detect [122, 142] and recover from error [93, 94, 121]. Recently, soft error in matrix
multiplication on a GPU has also been studied [43].
Since the introduction of the ’Fermi’ architecture [105], Error Correcting Code
(ECC) has been integrated to protect from errors in the GPU global memory, however
this adds overhead to communication and reduces overall computing performance.
In the realm of fault tolerant QR factorization, Givens rotation based QR has
been studied in [95]. However, since Householder QR is widely used in most modern
math libraries, in our work we consider a right-looking Householder based QR for a
hybrid CPU/GPU system. Our method is based on the error model by Luk et al. in
[90]. We extended this model by adding protection to the left factor Q and provided
optimized recovery algorithm on the GPU.

5.3

Hybrid QR

In linear algebra, a QR factorization decomposes a matrix A into a product A =
QR, where Q is an orthogonal matrix and R is an upper triangular matrix. QR
factorization is often used to solve the linear least squares problem, and also in QR
algorithm which is at the center of a special version of eigenvalue algorithm.
Several methods exist for computing the QR factorization, such as the GramSchmidt process, Householder transformations, and Givens rotations. In today’s
high performance math libraries, for instance, LAPACK [8], ScaLAPACK [37], and
MAGMA, a block version of the Householder transformations is adopted to achieve
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high performance with the memory hierarchy in modern systems. For example, given
an input matrix A, a Householder matrix Q1 is multiplied to A such that
2
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r11 r12 · · · r1n
0
..
.
0

A0

3
7
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This zeros out the elements under the diagonal in the first column. The next step
is carried out on the trailing matrix A0 with
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1 0 ··· 0
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In practice, MAGMA uses a block version of the QR factorization by accumulating
a few steps of the Householder matrix. This version is rich in level 3 BLAS operations
and therefore achieves high performance. The result of Q is stored under the lower
diagonal of the input matrix in the form of WY representation of Householder
transformation products[14, 116].
Implementation-wise, the algorithm used by MAGMA is close to the LAPACK
QR, except the MAGMA QR is designed and optimized for heterogeneous architectures, in particular, consisting of a CPU and a GPU. The way to accomplish this is
described as follows.
The hybrid QR that we consider has the input matrix and the result on the GPU
memory. The computational pattern is similar to the LAPACK’s QR – a sequence of
panel factorization followed by a corresponding trailing matrix update. The current
panel to be factored is sent to the CPU and factored using LAPACK. The result
is copied back to the GPU memory and used on the GPU for the trailing matrix
update. The update is split into two – first is an update for the columns that will
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form the“next” panel, followed by the update for the rest of the trailing matrix.
This splitting, known as lookahead technique, is done so that the factorization of
the next panel can start before finishing the entire update for which the next panel
is part of. This allows overlapping the large update of the trailing matrix and
sending the panel to the CPU, its factorization and copy back to the GPU. As a
result, for large enough matrices, the overall performance of the algorithm is dictated
by the performance of the matrix-matrix multiplications on the GPU. Note that
communication is minimized (and overlapped with computation) as on each step the
algorithm communicates a panel of size O(N B ⇥ N ) and performs operations of size

O(N B ⇥ N 2 ). For further detail on the implementation, one can see the sources
available through the MAGMA site.

5.4

Soft Error Modeling

MAGMA algorithms run with both the GPU and CPU, therefore soft errors on both
platforms are considered a source of contamination. Also since the result of panel
factorization and lookahead trailing panel commutes between the CPU and GPU
frequently, soft error could propagate between the GPU and CPU as well, depending
on when and where error occurs. To ease the error analysis and avoid dealing with
the timing of errors, we adopt the error modeling technique proposed in [90].

5.4.1

Error Model

Luk et al. derived their model for both LU and QR using the “ZU ” notation where
Z represents the left factor and U represents the right factor that is upper triangular.
We return to the “QR” notation for clarity, and have in mind the right-looking
Householder QR algorithm as the implementation method.
Having the initial matrix,
A0 = A,
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Householder QR is carried out by introducing Householder transforms from the left
to get the final triangular form. Let
At = Qt 1 At
Qt

1

1

is the Householder transform matrix at step t

1. At step t

1, error occurs at

random location (i, j) in matrix A as
Ãt = Qt 1 At
= Qt 1 (Qt

ei eTj

1
2

. . . Q0 )A0

(5.1)
ei eTj

ei is a column vector with all 0 elements except 1 as the ith element. Since no error
warning is raised, the factorization continues from step t till the end. If the soft error
at step t is viewed as the result of perturbation to an erroneous initial matrix

Ã = A
where d = (Qt

1

deTj

(5.2)

. . . Q0 ) 1 ei , then the erroneous process of QR factorization equals

to an error-free QR factorization from a erroneous initial matrix Ã.
In essence, this model treats the e↵ect of soft error as if the factorization starts
from a matrix that is a perturbation to the initial matrix. This is the same idea used
in Chapter 4, where the original idea by Luk, et al. has been extended to multiple
soft errors. In this chapter, therefore, we focus on the recovery of left and right factor
of QR factorization.

5.4.2

Checksum for R

In MAGMA, the right-looking Householder QR algorithm follows LAPACK QR
storage, where the right factor R overwrites the upper triangular part of the input
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Figure 5.1: Di↵erent regions of A during factorization
matrix, including the diagonals, while the lower triangular part is replaced by Q in
the form of vectors that defines elementary reflectors.
During QR factorization, once a panel of Q is produced, its values do not change
till the end. Theorem 3.5.1 has shown that Q cannot be protected by appending rows
of checksum at the bottom of the input matrix and having QR factorization along
with the checksum rows.
The part of the matrix other than Q is divided into two regions, the already formed
R and the trailing matrix A0 , as shown in Figure 5.1. Each iteration of the trailing
update moves a few rows from A0 to R, and therefore both A0 and R undergo constant
changes during the factorization, and cannot be protected by static checkpointing as
for Q. For R, we adopt the ABFT technique from [3, 79], which was also used in
Luk’s work [89, 90] for soft error in systolic arrays.
To capture one error, for input matrix A 2 R

m⇥n

, two generator matrices are

used, e = (1, 1, . . . , 1) and a random matrix w. e, w 2 R

m⇥1

.

Before factorization, two columns of checksum (Ae Aw) are calculated and
appended on the right of the input matrix as Ac = (A Ae Aw). Then QR factorization
is applied to Ac :
(A Ae Aw) = Q(R c v)
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c, v 2 R

m⇥1

are checksum columns after factorization.

Due to soft error, A becomes the erroneous matrix Ã, and the checkpointed matrix
becomes
(Ã Ae Aw)
And the QR factorization becomes:
(Ã Ae Aw) = Q̃(R̃ c̃ ṽ)

(5.3)

From (5.3)
c̃ = Q̃ 1 Ae = Q̃ 1 (Ã + deTj )e
= Q̃ 1 (Q̃R̃ + deTj )e
= R̃e + Q̃ 1 deTj e = R̃e + Q̃ 1 d
By the same token,
ṽ = R̃w + wj Q̃ 1 d
Assume residual vectors r, s 2 R

m⇥1

r̃ = c̃

R̃e = Q̃ 1 d

(5.4)

R̃w = wj Q̃ 1 d

(5.5)

and
s̃ = ṽ
Combining (5.4) and (5.5),
s̃ = wj r̃.

(5.6)

r̃ can be used to check for error, and in case an error occurs, the column in which the
error initially strikes can be determined by (5.6).
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5.5

Recovery Algorithm

With the knowledge of error column j, Luk et al. [90] recommended a spike-reducing
technique to recover the left and right factors of ZU factorization without giving the
actual algorithm. In this section we continue this work on a slightly di↵erent path
due to the storage format of MAGMA QR.

5.5.1

Spike-Eliminating Technique

Using the QR notation, the spike reducing technique in [90] starts with the di↵erence
of the true initial matrix A and the erroneous initial matrix Ã, obtained in Equation
5.2.

A

Ã = (a·j

Q̃R̃·j )eTj
Q̃R̃·j )eTj

A = Q̃R̃ + (a·j

A = Q̃R̃ + Q̃(Q̃T a·j

R̃·j )eTj

A = Q̃(R̃ + peTj )
A = Q̃C̃, C = R̃ + peTj , p = Q̃T a·j

R̃·j

(5.7)

C in (5.7) is an upper triangular matrix with a spike in column j. Since QR
requires Q to be an orthogonal matrix, orthogonal transformations are needed to
remove non-zeros related to the spike.
There are a few choices of algorithm such as Householder transformation and
Givens rotation. Householder is more computing intensive and has higher parallelism
which is more suitable for the GPU, but it also requires higher amount of extra
memory because, while the first Householder transformation removes the spike in
column j, the triangular submatrix (j + 1 : end, j + 1 : end) becomes a full matrix,
and if j is small, this requires an extra bu↵er almost as large as the data matrix
A and since in MAGMA QR the lower triangular is used to store Q, data matrix
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space cannot be borrowed. Given that the global memory on the GPU is normally
used to the limit for matrix data , Householder transformation does not qualify for
this high memory demand and we choose Givens rotation as the non-zero elimination
algorithm. In [90], Luk et al. also suggested a few methods including Givens rotation
to eliminate this spike with matrix factorization modifying method [66] in O(k 2 ) steps.
Since Givens rotation is memory-bound, implementation on the GPU requires careful
design for the best performance. This will be covered in section 5.5.3.

5.5.2

QR Update as the Recovery Algorithm

From (5.2), it can be seen that the recovery algorithm is in essence a QR update
problem. Since QR update is also widely used in applications where repeated updating
is required [124], this work implements the QR update algorithm for the GPU and
applies it to the soft error recovery problem at hand.
The rank-1 update to QR factorization has been described in [69]. We show the
algorithm in the context of QR recovery.
Given the erroneous initial matrix and its QR factorization Ã = Q̃R̃, the objective
is to find the QR factorization of the true initial matrix A = QR.
Let u = a·j

Q̃R̃·j , and v = ej ,

A = Ã + uv T
= Q̃R̃ + uv T
= Q̃(R̃ + Q̃T uv T )
) A = Q̃(R̃ + wv T ), w = Q̃T u = Q̃T a·j

114

R̃·j

First, a series of Givens rotations J T = J1T · · · JnT

1

is used such that

J T ⇥ w = ± kwk2 e1
The sequence 1 · · · n

1 applied from left to w means the elimination is from bottom

up. It can be shown that H = J T ⇥ R is an upper Hessenberg matrix, and therefore
J T ⇥ (R̃ + wv T ) = H ± kwk2 e1 v T = Ĥ
is also upper Hessenberg.
To get R from Ĥ, another series of Givens rotations GT = GTn

1

· · · GT1 is used

such that
GT ⇥ Ĥ = R
The sequence n

1 · · · 1 means the elimination is from top down.

Combining J and G,
Q = Q̃JG = Q̃(Jn

1

· · · J1 )(G1 · · · Gn 1 )

Algorithm 5 describes the above recovery procedure.
Algorithm 5 QR Recovery Algorithm based on QR-update
Require: Ã, Q̃, and R̃
Obtain a·j and R̃·j
Calculate w = Q̃T u = Q̃T a·j R̃·j
Zero out w using Givens Rotations as k1 = J T ⇥ w = ± kwk2 e1
Apply J T to R̃ as k2 = J T R̃, and store the subdiagonals of k2 into extra storage Y
Perform Ĥ = k2 + k1 eTj
Zero out subdiagonals of Ĥ by Givens rotations GT ⇥ Ĥ = R
Along with Algorithm 5, there are some implementation details worth noticing.
First, the column j of the original matrix A is required for recovery. For scientific
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applications that expect soft error with high probability, a mechanism to recover some
part of the original matrix is required. Some applications can generate any column
of A easily, others need to store the whole matrix A. In our implementation, at
the beginning of QR factorization, matrix A on the GPU memory is asynchronously
copied to the CPU memory during the first panel factorization for this purpose.
Second, recovery can be performed using the GPU in place or the CPU with two
data transfers, one to load data from the GPU to the CPU and one to store result
back. This solution is easier in implementation since LAPACK is equipped with
Givens rotation utilities like DLARTG and DLASR, but it su↵ers from performance
impact of data transfer and much lower parallelism of the CPU compared to the
GPU. Therefore, we choose to perform the QR recovery on the GPU in place with
the matrix data. Since R can only overwrite the upper triangular of A, subdiagonals
of k2 and Ĥ are kept in a separate 1D bu↵er Y .

5.5.3

Givens Rotation Utilities for the GPU

Givens rotation is at the center of the recovery procedure. Two operations involved
are DROTG and DLASR. While these operations are readily available for the CPU, on
the GPU they pose a significant challenge to be implemented with good performance
especially in a fused fashion. We’ll first discuss the two major challenges and then
our solution.
Memory Access Pattern
DROTG generates a plane rotation such that
2

32 3 2 3
f
r
4
54 5 = 4 5
s c
g
0
c

s

In this work we use an improved version of DROTG called DLARTG, which is more
numerically reliable [13].
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DLASR applies a set of plane rotations to a matrix in a certain order, for example
one set of plane rotation is applied to a 2 ⇥ N matrix,
2
4

c

s

s c

32
54

x11 · · ·

x1N

x21 · · ·

x2N

3

2

5=4

y11 · · ·

y1N

y21 · · ·

y2N

3
5

(5.8)

The FLOP count is 12N and the memory operation is 4N + 4, making it a memoryh
iT
bound operation. While each column of the right hand side y1j , y2j
can be
fully parallelized, without data reuse, on the GPU the performance of DLASR is still

limited by the memory bandwidth between the GPU global memory and the registers.
To make this situation worse, since MAGMA QR uses column-major storage, if each
thread calculated one column of the right hand side, the fetching of [xi1 , · · · , xiN ]
and [yi1 , · · · , yiN ], i = 1, 2 by each thread does not fit the condition of global memory
coalescing on the GPU, and each column has to be accessed one at a time.
Data Caching
In Algorithm 5, DLARTG and DROTG are fused together to firstly create the upper
Hessenberg matrix H, and then reduce it to upper triangular. This common operation
has two steps:

2

3

2 3
c s
x
5 using DLARTG for a vector 4 1 5
1. Generate a plane rotation 4
s c
y1
2
3
c s
5 to a 2 ⇥ N matrix as in (5.8) (DLASR)
2. Apply 4
s c

Both of these steps are carried out on the GPU. These two steps are consecutive.
Figure 5.2 is an example in the last step of Algorithm 5. The plus signs on the
subdiagonal are those elements to be zeroed out, and the red plus signs are the
values being eliminated in the current step. Green and red are the elements that
participate in the current step. This operation sweeps from top to bottom until an
upper triangular matrix is produced.
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Figure 5.2: Reduction from upper Hessenberg to upper triangular
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Figure 5.3: Reduction from upper Hessenberg to upper triangular (block algorithm)
Take the first two steps for example, the second row of the matrix is updated by
the DLASR in the first step and then used as input for the second step. To reduce
global memory access that is far more expensive than that of registers and shared
memory on the GPU, this row should be cached for the next step rather than read
from global memory after being just written there. Naturally we use one thread to
handle each column of H, and given the size of H, more than one thread blocks is
needed for each step. In addition, one thread blocks (one thread per se) performs the
DLRTG before all the DLARTG thread blocks could start, hence a synchronization is
needed to hold DLASR threads while waiting for the one thread that does DLARTG
to finish. To achieve the aforementioned caching using registers, both DLARTG
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and DLASR functionalities need to reside in one GPU kernel, otherwise the DLASR
kernel calls are separated from each other by DLARTG kernel calls, and caching
can only be done through shared memory, which is less efficient. The dilemma here
is that CUDA o↵ers no lightweight mechanism to synchronize all thread blocks from
within threads. Available synchronization mechanisms include global synchronization
initiated by host, and synchronization of all threads within a thread block. The
atomic operation provides some possibilities but threads that participate in an atomic
operation through a variable in global memory are serialized, and therefore su↵ers a
large performance penalty.
Algorithm for fused DLARTG and DLASR operation
For dense linear algebra, blocked algorithms have been widely used to achieve high
performance on modern computer systems with complex cache hierarchy [47]. To
bridge the requirement of caching intermediate rows to reduce global memory access
and the difficulty of no lightweight synchronization from within threads, we devised
the following algorithm for the fused DLARTG and DLASR operation by having each
step work with a block of data rather than only 2 rows.
Two types of kernels are designed. The first kernel generates a set of plane
rotations and use these rotations to reduce an N B ⇥N B upper Hessenberg submatrix
on the diagonal to upper triangular. N B is selected as the maximum number of
threads per thread block allowed by the GPU in use except for edge cases. In our
experiment, with a Tesla T20, aka ’Fermi’, N B = 1024.
The second kernel applies this set of plane rotations to all the data on the right of
the diagonal N B ⇥N B. Global synchronization on the host is used between these two
kernels. This algorithm moves down along the diagonal with a step size of N B until
an upper triangular matrix is produced. Figure 5.3 is an example of this algorithm
with N B = 5. During each iteration, only one thread block is spawned for the first
type of kernel and as many thread blocks as needed are spawned for the second kernel.
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Within the first kernel, steps proceed as in the unblocked version of fused
DLARTG and DLASR. Intermediate rows that are produced by step i

1 and will be

used in step i are cached in registers to avoid loading from global memory. Threadblock level synchronization is used to separate DLARTG and DLASR functionalies.
Within the second kernel, steps proceed from the top down, one row each step.
Similarly, intermediate rows are cached in registers. The plane rotations are stored
in two vectors, respectively, in global memory to pass between the two kernels. In
the second kernel, the fetching of current plane rotation pair c and s that is on the
critical path of execution is moved to the beginning of kernel execution where N B
threads are used to fetch N B plane rotation pairs in a coalesced fashion.
Efficient Memory Access Scheme
Figure 5.4 is a modified memory access scheme to remedy the problem discussed in
section 5.5.3 for the type II kernel in section 5.5.3.
In the original kernel, all threads are lined up in a row, and during each step each
thread fetches two values in a column along with a Given rotation pair from global
memory. For double precision (8-byte word) memory access within half warp to be
coalesced, CUDA requires all 16 words to fall in the same 16-word segment [106] but
since each element in consecutive columns of this row are separated by the leading
dimension, the coalescing rule does not hold.
In order to benefit from the throughput advantage provided by coalescing, a level
of inner blocking is added to the kernel. Take Tesla T20 for example where the
maximum number of thread per thread block is 1024. Rather than striding one row
down at each step, a 4 ⇥ 64 block of data (yellow) are fetched together from global
memory to the corresponding 64 ⇥ 4 piece in a shared memory bu↵er of size 1024 ⇥ 4
using a 16 ⇥ 64 layout of the 1024 threads such that all 16 threads in each column
of the grid have consecutive thread IDs. Therefore the 4 ⇥ 64 = 256 elements in the
yellow zone are fetched by 64 coalesced accesses. These fetching loops continue from
left to right until the four rows are completely loaded. After the loading, thread layout
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Figure 5.4: Global memory accesses in the blocked DLASR kernel
is re-arranged to 1024 ⇥ 1 in the inner blocking. Each thread loads two consecutive
elements in a row from the shared memory. The layout of the shared memory bu↵er
lowers the bank conflict to minimum. The inner blocking loop consumes the four
rows of data (four columns in shared memory) to apply the corresponding Givens
rotations, and once this four rows are finished, results are written back in the same
coalesced manner as loading.
The scheme described in this section can also be used for other similar kernels in
this work.
Improvement Experiment
Figure 5.5 is an experiment result of the run time for the reduction of H from
upper Hessenberg to upper triangular. The matrix size derives from actual recovery
experiment in section 5.7.3 where the impact of the new reduction algorithm on
recovery performance is shown in Figure 5.9. By using a more efficient memory
access pattern and the blocked algorithm for fused DLARTG and DLASR operation,
5x speedup is achieved.
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Figure 5.5: Run time comparison of the blocked DLASR (optimized) kernel and the
original version

5.6

Protection for Q

Theorem 3.5.1 has shown that Q cannot be protected by ABFT as R, and the spikeeliminating algorithm 5 inherited from work by Luk et al. [90] function under the
assumption that no soft error strikes Q̃, which is the erroneous Q caused by soft error
in R or A0 . In MAGMA QR, since Q occupies half of the matrix, it is as eligible to
be soft error victim as other section of the matrix and therefore has to be protected.

5.6.1

Static Checkpointing for Q

In order to provide soft error resilience to Q, we propose to use diskless checkpointing
algorithm because once a panel is factorized on the CPU, the result remains
unchanged until the end of factorization.
For any column of the factorized panel vi = [vi1 , vi2 , · · · , vik ]T , the objective of the
checkpointing scheme is to allow recovery from errors that occur to random items in
the column. It has been shown in Section 4.4 how soft errors in a column of L in
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Figure 5.6: MAGMA QR tracing
LU can be protected with trivial overhead. Q can be protected by the same method,
including encoding, error detection and recovery, and dimension reduction, except
that the vector vi being encoded is not a column of Q but the vector that is used to
generate the Householder transformation of the form Hi = I

5.6.2

⌧i vi viT [38].

Timing of Checkpointing

The checkponting for Q is performed once per iteration of the QR factorization.
Therefore the placement of this procedure requires careful consideration to avoid
large performance penalty.
As described in section 5.3, The GPU onsite version of MAGMA QR produces
Q using the CPU implementation DGEQRF and during step i, an Mi ⇥ N B block
of the trailing matrix is sent from the GPU to the CPU memory to be factorized by
DGEQRF. Then the triangular factor T of a real block reflector H is constructed by
DLARFT on the CPU and both the panel factorization and T are sent to the GPU to
update the trailing matrix using a GPU version DLARFB. This process is illustrated
by the trace of an actual MAGMA QR run on a 48-core CPU + NVIDIA T20 GPU
machine shown in Figure 5.6 generated by TAU (Tuning and Analysis Utilities) [12].
The size of this run is 17408 ⇥ 17408, and only the first few iterations are shown.
The best way to place the checkponting for Q such that performance overhead is
minimized is finding a time slot where CPU and GPU tasks are fully overlapped and
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Figure 5.7: Performance of FT-QR with/without checkpointing for Q
CPU idles waiting for the GPU tasks to finish. Even though the DLARFB on the
GPU takes a long time to finish, through using lookahead it keeps the CPU busy most
of the time, leaving very little room for extra operation. By closely examining the
tracing, we notice that the yellow section that represents cublasSetMatrix(), which
sends panel factorization result from the CPU to the GPU, actually takes longer than
the actual communication, and the reason is that cublasSetMatrix() is a blocking call
on the GPU and it does not start the data transfer until all activities on the GPU
started previously are finished. From Figure 5.6, clearly cublasSetMatrix() is always
called on the CPU during the trailing matrix update (DLARFB) on the GPU and this
accordingly not only blocks both the data transferring to the GPU, but also put the
CPU in a busy wait and therefore cannot perform other tasks. This does not a↵ect
the performance of MAGMA QR since MAGMA QR uses 1-depth lookahead and
therefore the next trailing matrix update cannot start anyway without the previous
one finished.
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Figure 5.8: Performance of recovery for errors in Q
To release the CPU from the busy wait, cublasSetMatrix() is replaced with
an asynchronous data transferring function cudaMemcpy2DAsync(). This function
initiates the data transferring and returns control immediately to the CPU. The time
gap between this initiation time and when the GPU DLARFB is finished is large
enough to hide the checkpointing Q from the critical path. As the trailing matrix
becomes smaller, there is a certain threshold of time when the GPU DLARFB finishes
before the initiation of cublasSetMatrix(), and this could expose the checkpointing
and cause performance impact, but this only accounts for a small portion of the
execution. For such a situation, the checkpointing could be moved to run on the
GPU between the time GPU DLARFB finishes and the initiation of cublasSetMatrix
on the CPU.

125

5.7

Performance Evaluation

In this section we evaluate the performance of the fault tolerant QR algorithm on two
hybrid systems. The configuration of the first experiment platform is in table 5.1:
MKL with 48 threads is used on the CPU and CUDA 4.0 is driving the GPU. All
computing is in double precision and based on MAGMA version 1.0. The maximal
matrix size is limited by the GPU global memory.
As discussed in section 5.5.2, the recovery algorithm requires a column of the
original matrix. While this column may be re-generated cheaply, in our experiment
we want to simulate the worst case where this convenience is not available, and
therefore the original matrix is duplicated for the recovery process. Since the GPU
memory is relatively small compared to that of the host, and is normally fully utilized
for computing, the copy of the original matrix is put on the host memory. To avoid
performance impact, the data transferring is performed asynchronously during the
first panel factorization. The panel data is copied first so that DGEQRF on the
CPU could start as soon as possible, and while the CPU is busy with the panel
factorization, the rest of data is copied through DMA to the host memory. All the
performance results shown in this section include this overhead.

5.7.1

Overhead Analysis

The overhead of fault tolerance comes from the following sources:
1. Duplicating the original matrix from the GPU to the CPU
2. Generating checksum on the GPU
3. Performing QR with two checksum columns on the GPU
Brand
CPU AMD Opteron 6180 SE
GPU
NVIDIA C2050

Frequency
2.5 GHz
1.1 GHz

# cores
48
14

Table 5.1: Experiment configuration
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Memory
256 Gb
2.7 Gb

4. checkpointing Q on the CPU
5. Check for error in R and A0 on the GPU
6. Check for error in Q on the GPU
7. Recovery from error in Q on the CPU and GPU
8. Recovery from error in R and A0 on the GPU
Each item of the overhead sources, except the memory copy, requires O(n2 ) extra
FLOPS. And comparing to the 43 n3 FLOPS of QR factorization, the overhead fades
away when matrix size is large enough.

5.7.2

Checkpointing of Q

Figure 5.7 is an experiment to show the overhead caused by checkpointing Q. The red
line shows the performance without checkpointing Q and the performance between
the red line and blue line is the overhead caused by (1)-(3) and (5)-(6) in the overhead
source list. With the checkpointing Q switched on, the green line performance dips
by another 5% at large matrix sizes. The green line represents the case of our fault
tolerant QR runs without any error. To compare the performance with the CPU
implementation, the result of MKL QR running with 48 threads is also shown. It can
be seen that even with the overhead of fault tolerance, our FT-QR is still showing
2-3x speedup over the CPU implementation.

5.7.3

Recovery

Since our algorithm can deal with errors in the full matrix, the recovery performance
are divided into the left factor and the right factor.
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Figure 5.9: Performance of recovery for error in R
The Right Factor
Figure 5.8 is the performance of recovery from errors in Q. Two errors are injected to
column 312 in rows 612 and 729 respectively. This experiment is simulating random
double errors in a column of Q and therefore the error locations are not informed to
the recovery algorithm. Performance result shows a small overhead from the no-error
case of the fault tolerant QR, and about 15% decrease from the original MAGMA
QR. This percentage will continue to drop as matrix sizes grows larger permitted by
GPU with larger global memory.
The Left Factor
Figure 5.9 is the performance of recovery from error initially in R or A0 . For all
matrix sizes, error is injected to a random location (7681,7682) in A0 on the GPU
right before the 31st step of panel factorization. The purple line is the performance
of FT-QR with checkpointing Q and no error.
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Two recovery performances are shown. The green line is the plain implementation
of Givens rotation utilities on the GPU. This implementation is limited by the GPU
global memory access speed without the help of coalescing and shared memory. The
red line is the optimized recovery performance where a blocked and fused DLARTG
and DLASR with better memory access mechanism is in place. At the largest problem
size available to this GPU, the optimization improves 5% of the recovery performance.
The recovery from one soft error in A0 , using the optimized algorithm, reduces 15% of
the overall performance of QR. This percentage will also continue to drop with larger
matrix sizes.

5.7.4

Result on Keeneland

The NVIDIA C2050 has relative small on-chip global memory which limits the size of
matrix in the first experiment. The second testing platform is the Keeneland Initial
Delivery system which features a cluster of NVIDIA M2070 with 6GB memory, and
each host runs two Intel Westmere hex-core CPUs. Figure 5.10 is the performance of
both the original and soft error resilient MAGMA QR on a single node of Keeneland.
Error recovery experiments use the same setup as in the test on C2050, and as a
comparison, MKL QR performance is also shown running with 12 threads on a single
node. The extended matrix size range shows similar overhead to the result on C2050,
verifying that with the small overhead of fault resilience functionalities, the hybrid
QR still outperforms multi-threaded QR on the multicore CPUs by almost 100%, and
errors can be recovered with little performance impact.

5.8

Conclusion

In this chapter we developed a soft error resilient QR algorithm for hybrid architecture
where the CPU and GPU are utilized together.
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This work enables the high
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Figure 5.10: Performance on Keeneland
performance implementation of MAGMA QR to be tolerant to soft errors caused
by radiation-based interference.
In the ABFT algorithm by Luk et al., the FT-QR algorithm can tolerate up to
one soft error in data section R and A0 . Since the recovery algorithm requires an
error-free left factor Q, which is not guaranteed by Luk’s algorithm, a stable and
scalable multiple-error checkpointing/recovery mechanism is devised and placed in
the computing environment based on the execution feature of MAGMA QR such
that the checkpointing is hidden away from the critical path and therefore prevents
severe performance impact. In addition, a more efficient recovery algorithm based on
Givens rotation is designed. This fast Givens rotation utilities can also be used in
other applications to reduce an upper Hessenberg matrix to upper triangular on the
GPU.
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Chapter 6
Conclusions and Future Work
6.1

Conclusion

In this dissertation, fault tolerant algorithms for both hard and soft error are
developed for dense linear algebra operations on HPC systems, including large scale
cluster system and hybrid system with multicore CPU and the GPGPU. For both
kinds of error, we focus on full matrix protection and practical issue in real-world
computing systems, such as scalability, performance impact, recovery of execution
(program stack) without full fault tolerance MPI system support.
For hard errors, we developed the scalable parallel-Q checkpointing scheme, which
allows the left factor to be efficiently protected with low performance impact and
storage requirement. For the right factor we adopted the ABFT checksum and by
using the Checkpointing-on-Failure technique, the dense matrix operations such as
LU and QR factorization can recover both the lost data and running stack on the
failed process. In the case where failure occurs during the trailing matrix update,
immediate recovery might not be plausible due to the inconsistency of matrix states
on all the processes. For such case we have shown by both proof and implementation
that a delayed recovery could resolve the problem because trailing update is composed
of operations that obey the rule of ABFT.
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Soft error is more challenging to tolerate than hard error because transient errors
normally do not cause system to crash and therefore leave no trace of existence. The
e↵ect of this silent errors is that erroneous data are carried into further computation
and eventually causes large area of errors due to propagation. To combat soft error, we
developed full matrix protection technique such that multiple soft errors in both the
left and right factor can be detected, and both the factorization based linear system
solver and the factorization itself can successfully reach correct result by recovery. We
developed a floating point number encoding scheme that is used in both the scalable
local checkpointing for the left factor and the ABFT based method for the right factor.
This encoding scheme is resilient to the nature errors of floating point operation such
as round-o↵ and cancellation, and enables the determination of soft error locations.
Soft errors in the left factor are corrected in a column-by-column fashion, while soft
errors in the right factor are corrected by using the combination of soft error modeling
and recovery schemes such as QR update and Sherman-Morrison-Woodbury. One
particular practical issue is the computation complexity of such detection and recovery
scheme. To this need, a complexity reduction method is devised where encoding is
p
performed in segments such as N . This drops the complexity to be lower than
that of the matrix factorization and solver and thus leads to negligible overhead on
real-world HPC systems.
Since more and more HPC systems nowadays are equipped with the GPGPU, and
the GPGPU has historically been under-protected of ECC scheme, we have applied
the proposed soft error resilience to hybrid systems with the GPGPU. Based on the
hybrid QR factorization from MAGMA, vectors in the lower triangular matrix that
are used to form the orthogonal left factor Q are protected by the floating point
number weighted checksum performed by CPU in a time gap when CPU awaits GPU
to finish the trailing matrix update, and the right factor R which normally su↵ers
large area of propagated errors is recovered by a combination of QR update and an
efficient fast Givens Rotation for the GPGPU.
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Experiments on large scale cluster and hybrid HPC system have confirmed that
the developed algorithms all meet the design criteria in terms of error correction and
performance/storage overhead. This altogether o↵ers very promising alternatives to
the currently widely used checkpointing/restart method with much less overhead and
energy consumption.

6.2

Future Work

This work uses the soft error model where the soft errors present in the form
of changing the value of floating point number, and in our implementation such
changing does not involve the extreme cases where bit flips in the IEEE 754 format
representation cause “horrendous” modification, for example to N aN . Considering
the practical possibility of such event happening, either an uncorrectable error
notification should be raise to applications or such errors could be corrected in an
online fashion because neither ABFT nor any of the checkpointing scheme in the field
of soft error fault tolerance is e↵ective by performing correction o↵-line. This will be
addressed as part of the future work.
With the quick development of the GPGPU in both performance and application,
more and more HPC cluster systems are being equipped with the GPGPU. With
this added complexity and large scale, fault tolerance will become a critical issue that
threatens productivity. To meet the goal of providing high reliability on such systems,
we are in development of fault tolerance algorithm that could support multiple hard
errors and soft errors in large scale distributed memory cluster system with the
GPGPU.
Another interesting area is the protection of dense linear algebra computation
on multicore nodes with tile algorithms. Our current implementation is based on
LAPACK and ScaLAPACK which use an “old-fashion” fork-join parallelism model.
However on multicore CPU system, tile algorithm such as in [4] produces better
performance. We will extended the fault tolerance coverage to such system.
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